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 From self-sovereignty to individual independence, freedom is about control. When people want 
freedom, they yearn for exclusive control over their life. Liberal institutions, from democracy to market 
economies, however, do not offer people control. Instead, liberal machinery outsources control to a 
collective, invisible power. Far from control, chaos governs liberal society. In the earliest stages of 
development, liberalism did serve the pursuit of freedom because liberal reforms focus on the destruction 
of controlling power from above, i.e. the expansion of liberty. Because controlling oneself first requires 
being controlled by no one else, liberty is the first, but incomplete, step toward freedom. After these first 
stages, however, the relationship breaks down. Liberalism can only liberate; it cannot cultivate the self-
power at the heart of freedom. By continuing to promise a freedom liberalism cannot deliver, those who 
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Introduction 
Freedom is one of the great contested ideas. Observers have described freedom as ―plastic[],‖1 
―porous‖2 and ―elastic.‖3 Everyone wants freedom, but everyone wants a separate freedom.4 Because 
―different men at different times have meant different things by liberty,‖ the annals of history are filled 
with assorted and confused conceptions, understandings and practices.5 Even the words are confused. 
English is blessed and cursed with two words directly related to the freedom concept, yet freedom and 
liberty haphazardly appear in each other‘s place, with little thought to any possible difference of nuance.6 
Every Western philosophical tradition maintains some central understanding of freedom.7 
Totalitarians and democrats alike claim fealty to some flavor of freedom.8 As Gerald McCallum‘s 
                                                            
1. John Christman, ―Saving Positive Freedom,‖ Political Theory 33, no. 1 (Feb. 2005), 79. Small portions of 
this project were taken from papers written in the process of seeking a Master‘s in Political Science at the University of 
Memphis.  
 
2. Isaiah Berlin, ―Two Concepts of Liberty,‖ in Isaiah Berlin: The Proper Study of Mankind, An Anthology of 
Essays, ed. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), 191.  
 
3. Quoted in John Gray, ―On Liberty, Liberalism and Essential Contestability,‖ British Journal of Political 
Science 8, no.2 (October 1978), 386. 
 
4. There is no shortage of thinkers who point to this observation. In fact, the observation that freedom means 
many things to different people is as old as the term freedom itself. See Isaiah Berlin, ―Two Concepts of Liberty,‖ 193. 
(―Almost every moralist in human history has praised freedom. Like happiness and goodness, like nature and reality, it 
is a term who meaning is so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist, pg. 193); Abraham 
Lincoln, ―Address at Sanitary Fair,‖ April 18, 1864. Available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp? 
document=1067 (accessed June 1, 2011). (―The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and the 
American people, just now, are much in want of one. We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not 
all mean the same thing.‖) Reiterated in Hans Morgenthau, ―The Dilemmas of Freedom,‖ The American Political 
Science Review 51, no. 3 (Sept. 1957), 714. Max Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and Thought: The History of an Ideal 
(New York: The Humanities Press, 1966), translated by Carl Lofmark, ix. (―There is no slogan so much in vogue today 
or used in so many different sense as the word ‗freedom.‘ No sooner have we read it in a newspaper of the free world in 
the West than we hear the echo from the East: ‗Freedom? Only we have it, freedom from capitalism and 
exploitation.‘‖). 
 
5. Maurice Cranston, ‗Liberalism,‘ in Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Cillier-
Macmillan, 1972), vol. 4, pg. 458, quoted in John Gray, ―On Liberty, Liberalism and Essential Contestability,‖ 385-
386. Harry Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990), 43. 
(―In a typical tribute made in 1828, Edward Everett, a future U.S. senator from Massachusetts, hailed ‗the History of 
Liberty‘ as ‗the real history of man.‘‖).  
 
6. Hannah Arendt and Hanna Pitkin are two of the only theorists to explicitly distinguish between liberty and 
freedom, though Bruce Baum does argue there are two implicit conceptions of liberty and freedom in J. S. Mill‘s 
collective work. See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 2006); Hanna Pitkin, ―Are Freedom 
and Liberty Twins? Political Theory 16, no. 4 (Nov. 1988): 523-552. 
 
7. Hannah Arendt, ―What is Authority?‖ in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought 
(New York: The Viking Press, 1968), 97; John Gray, Introduction to Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy, 
ed. Zbigniew Pelczynski and John Gray (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1984), 1.  
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popular analysis — which construes freedom as an agent X seeking freedom from Y to do Z — 
demonstrates we are often forced to think of freedom as ―one overarching conceptual schema allowing 
for several different conceptions.‖9 The great debates over freedom ultimately argue about the domains 
of the several variables rather than competing conceptions. 
 Despite freedom‘s central role in Western political philosophy, it is barely a second consideration 
in other major traditions. Orlando Patterson explains the Japanese had no word for freedom prior to the 
opening of Japan in the 19th century. The first translators had terrible trouble in finding a sufficient 
substitute, and ultimately decided on a word (自由,jiyu) which tended to emphasize ‗licentiousness.‘10 
The Chinese did have a word for freedom, but it was primarily a Confucian pejorative, conveying the 
―sense of existing by oneself (hardly a virtue in China).‖11 After the partition of their country into spheres of 
influence, Chinese philosophers did begin to discuss Western freedom at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Western literature tends to focus on the contributions of Liáng Qǐchāo (梁启超), who first introduced Western 
political classics to China.12 Combing traditional Confucian communitarian values with a reaction against 
China‘s international humiliation, Liáng emphasized the importance of individual freedom as the submission 
to social needs. Echoing the recurrent understanding of freedom as sovereignty, Liáng wrote, ―Freedom 
means Freedom for the Group, not Freedom for the Individual….Men must not be slaves to other men, but 
they must be slaves to their groups. For, if they are not slaves to their own group, they will assuredly become 
slaves to some other.‖13 Though Chinese attitudes of freedom may be incorporating Western ideas, there is 
                                                            
8.  Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2007), 5; Gertrude Himmelfarb, ―Editor‘s Introduction,‖ in John Stuart Mill: On Liberty by John 
Stuart Mill (London: Penguin Books, 1974), 7; For a particularly bizarre example of an exploration of fascist freedom, 
see Mario Pei, ―Freedom under Fascism,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 180 (July 
1935): 9-13. 
 
9. See Christman, 81; Gerald MacCallum, Jr., ―Negative and Positive Freedom,‖ The Philosophical Review 
76, no. 3 (July, 1967). 
 
10. Orlando Patterson, Freedom, Vol. 1: Freedom in the Making of Western Culture (New York: Basic 




12. See Andrew Nathan Jr., ―Redefinitions of freedom in China,‖ in The Idea of Freedom in Asia and Africa, 
ed. Robert H. Taylor (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002): 248-272. 
 
13. Edmund Fung, ―The Idea of Freedom in Modern China Revisited: Plural Conceptions and Dual 
Responsibilities,‖ Modern China 32, no. 4 (Oct. 2006), 454. 
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little indication or widespread desire to abandon these traditional communitarian values.14 Individual liberty 
remains ―a right to be exercised in the service of the state and for social ends, giving primacy to collective 
interests over individual interests.‖15 This fits with the historical development of Chinese philosophy, which 
developed amid impressive political stability and was more concerned with the good exercise of political 
power, rather than its just origin.16 It simply appears incompatible with modern Western freedom, with its 
emphasis on autonomy and independence from social pressure. 
The Arabic ḥurr and ḥurrīyah (free and freedom), likewise, contain none of the self-sovereignty 
found in the Western ideal. The Encyclopedia of Islam described Islamic freedom, encapsulated in the term 
ḥurrīyah as the state of ―divine enthrallment.‖17 It is the freedom from unbelief. The importance of the 
sovereignty of God is reflected in freedom, the understanding of free rights and the law generally.18 The 
entire society is constructed to encourage ―man to live under the sovereignty of God and in accordance with 
His will.‖19 Only very recently, probably due to the expanding American attention to the region, has the 
idea of individual freedom as Westerners understand it begun to develop in earnest.20 
These non-Western cultures, just to name a few, do not share Europe‘s freedom fascination. In 
interacting with the West, they nevertheless feel compelled to confront the idea. Juxtaposed against the rest of 
the world‘s general apathy toward individual freedom, the freedom‘s centrality and diversity in the West is 
truly amazing. Even the quickest examination shows that ―however much it may be distorted in conception, 
                                                            
14. Fareed Zakaria and Lee Kuan Yew, ―Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,‖ Foreign 
Affairs 73, no. 2 (March – April, 1994): 109-126.  
 
15. Fung, 454. 
 
16. Shaun O‘Dwyer, ―Democracy and Confucian Values,‖ Philosophy of East and West 53, no. 1 (January 
2003), 44. 
 
17. F. Rosenthal, ―ḥurrīyya,‖ in vol. 3 of The Encyclopedia of Islam, ed. B. Lewis, V.L. Ménage, et al. 
(Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1971), 589. 
 
18. For example of the troubles of ‗basic freedom‘ in the Islamic world see, George N. Sfeir, ―Basic 
Freedoms in a Fractured Legal Culture: Egypt and the Case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd,‖ Middle East Journal 52, no. 3 
(Summer 1998): 402-414.  
 
19. Fazlur Rahman, Islam, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 68.  
 
20. Reuel Gerecht, ―How Democracy Became Halal,‖ New York Times, February 6, 2011, The Opinion 
Pages, National Edition, A23.  
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the idea itself continues to exercise that ultimate authority which once belonged to the idea of God, nature, 
justice, reason, or the ideal polity.‖21 Like happiness or goodness, it is a ―source of value‖ in its own right.22  
FREEDOM & 
As an important concept, freedom is often discussed within the context of the other great political 
ideas. Rather than simplifying the conceptual field, the range of ‗freedom &‘ debates further complicate 
freedom‘s philosophical role.  
For example, in the Freedom & Rights literature, people discuss freedom and liberty in the 
context of specific rights: the freedom or liberty to move about, untied to a particular spot; th e freedom 
to pursue happiness or cultivation; the freedom to speak, think or worship on the sole dictates of one‘s 
conscience.23 Most of these examples are tangential to the larger discussion here. Very often, ‗Freedom 
& Rights‘ discussions refer only to specific operationalizations of freedom. The freedoms of speech or 
the freedoms to assemble are types of freedoms, things you may do freely, but having one or the other 
does not make you free.24   
Other types of ‗freedom &‘ debates involve the often confused interaction between freedom and the 
universe of other important philosophical values. Freedom and democracy; freedom and equality; freedom 
and justice, morality and happiness appear time after time, as writers try to discuss their natural interactions.  
Freedom & Equality is one of the oldest, and most important connections. As we will see in 
Chapter 1, for example, the Greeks understood freedom almost exclusively in connection with equality, the 
freedom of isonomy. Furthermore, many conservative critiques of liberalism and democracy revolve 
around a rejection of the supposed link between freedom and equality, generally by way of a rejection of 
equality. Marxist, socialist and feminist literature, by contrast, almost invariable associate freedom and 
equality to such a degree the two concepts become one. According to this perspective, freedom is 
discovered and made possible only in a rampant total equality that destroys all relations of domination and 
                                                            
21. Himmelfarb, 7; Patterson, ix. 
 
22. Isaiah Berlin, ―Two Concepts of Liberty,‖ 193; Putterman, 418. 
 
23. Watson, 43.  
 
24. David Hoekema, Rights and Wrongs: Coercion, Punishment and the State (Cranbury, NJ: Associated 
University Presses, 1986), 65. 
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subordination. Such a claim seems to make sense if by freedom you mean equal freedom for all, but as we 
will see later, for the majority of human history unequal freedom has been the accepted norm.  
As Isaiah Berlin points out, these ‗Freedom &‘ discussions, which try to find the harmony 
between freedom and some other philosophical or moral desirable, are rooted ―an ancient doctrine 
according to which all truly good things are linked to another in a single, perfect whole; or, at the very least 
cannot be incompatible with one another.‖25 This is especially true when scholars engage in a redefinition 
of freedom as one thing or another. Rousseau is famous for redefining freedom as democracy; the Stoics, 
freedom as virtue.  
If nothing else, the present project is a repudiation of that philosophical free lunch. Just because 
two ideas are equally good and desirable does not mean they may coexist. There is nothing, for example, 
that says freedom, as I understand the concept, must only exist within equal relations. To the contrary, 
freedom is more readily realizable in societies marked by perfectly stratified relations. Moreover, these 
conflicts are hidden, as is the case for the central dichotomy of this project, the tension between freedom 
and liberalism. The purpose of the following pages is to show that two perfectly good ideals, freedom and 
liberalism, are at natural odds. That the liberal promise of freedom is a false promise. It is also a call for 
ideological maturity, all call to confront the inconsistencies and complications of ideal human existence and 
engages a practical equilibrium. Otherwise, we risk losing the institutions that matter most to us and our 
well-being in the philosophical goose-chase that is harmonious perfection.   
Though many of these ‗Freedom &‘ debates illustrate freedom‘s place in human society, no 
project can touch on them all or pretend meaningful comprehensiveness. Very often space does not allow 
for more than a comment or two on what could, and has, formed the basis of another stand-alone work. The 
goal here is to identify a meta-conceptualization of freedom as control includes as many varieties of 
freedom as possible, and then examine the implications of this theory of freedom. I do not pretend this 
understanding of freedom is terribly complete or complex. I only mean for it to be useful in understanding 
how liberalism fails to live up to the promises of freedom, of individual control, (falsely) ascribed to it.  
That thesis should not be taken as an indictment of either freedom or liberalism. Liberalism is the 
foundation of our society, and is one of the greatest sources of human justice and progress. The pursuit of 
                                                            
25. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), x.   
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freedom is likewise deeply embedded in the Western philosophical tradition. The denunciation here is 
aimed entirely at those who claim liberalism, from capitalist market economics to democratic society, 
delivers something akin to freedom. Liberalism cannot bring people to freedom because the key 
mechanisms of liberal society outsource individual control, which is the heart of freedom, to the invisible 
forces binding and motivating society. The false liberal freedom promises raise expectations and hopes so 
high, nothing begets but frustration. Disillusioned, people abandon liberalism and lose the greatest 
foundation for peace and prosperity yet conceived. 
Part of the problem is freedom is too big an idea. It would be nice to scale down freedom, to bring it 
back down to size. It is need not be imbued with the monumental importance it usually contains. To be free is 
the human birthright, people say.26 It is the definition of what it means to be a man.  Martin Luther King, Jr. 
rooted an ―ethical demand of integration...[in] a recognition of the fact that a denial of freedom to an 
individual is a denial of life itself.‖27 ―The very character of the life of man,‖ he writes, ―demands freedom.‖28 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau likewise believed, ―to renounce one‘s freedom is to renounce one‘s status as a man, 
the rights of humanity and its duties.‖29 Both Kant and Rousseau, to name just two, ―took man‘s capacity for 
free will to be a distinctive quality of his nature, distinguishing man from other animals.‖30 To lose that state, 
is not merely to surrender to slavery, but involves a de-evolution of dignity to sub-human status. But surely 
other qualities are just as indicative of humanness as freedom; perhaps it is to these other qualities, the liberal 
qualities of participation and pursuit, we should begin to place greater emphasis on.  
The problem of freedom is all the more troubling, and understandable, considering its operational 
varieties are very often mutually exclusive. President Abraham Lincoln realized how he himself was at a 
fulcrum of a particularly intense iteration of the freedom debate. Noting the use of ‗liberty‘ in the North 
                                                            
26. Pohlenz, ix.  
 
27. Martin Luther King, Jr., ―The Ethical Demands for Integration,‖ in A Testament of Hope: The Essential 
Writing and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. James Melvin Washington (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 




29. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy, ed. 
Roger D. Master, trans. Judith Masters (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin‘s, 1978), 50. 
 
30. Stephen Ellenburg, ―Rousseau and Kant: principle of political right,‖ in Rousseau after 200 Years: 
Proceedings of the Cambridge Bicentennial Colloquium, ed. R. A. Leigh (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978), 3.   
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signaled the autonomy to own one‘s labor, he remarks how in the South it means very directly the 
autonomy to own another‘s. ―Here are two, not only different, but incompatible things,‖ he writes, ―called 
by the same name — liberty. And it follows that each of the things is, by the respective [opposing] parties, 
called by two different and incompatible names — liberty and tyranny.‖31 Freedom is such a porous 
concept because it is very often the defense of a way of life. It simply means something different to 
everyone. When those conflicting images collide, as they did during the American Civil War, the resulting 
conflicts very often shaken men and nations to their very foundations. 
CONTROL 
One man‘s freedom is another‘s tyranny because freedom is more than just the liberty to think, do 
or go as one pleases. Freedom is control. And one man‘s free control is very often another‘s controlled 
slavery. ―Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows.‖32 Whether we call freedom, as so many different 
scholars have called it, ‗sovereignty,‘ ‗self-possession,‘ ‗self-mastery,‘ or even less precisely independence 
or autonomy, the central concept we are approaching is self-control.  
The ultimate problem is liberal society does not cultivate these feelings of self-empowerment, nor 
allow for their easy exercise. This is not true of all theories of society. Even if it fails to deliver, Marxism 
specifically promises the perfect society of free men, fully self-possessed, independent and in control of the 
social forces around him.33 Many other liberal critiques, from both the political wings, implicitly 
comprehend liberalism‘s inability to create real freedom as well, and offer various solutions. 
We all seek control of our environment and the people around us. Where control over the self is 
the issue, it very quickly becomes control over everything else. The desire for control is the desire for 
order and regularity, for predictability and peace. It is strongly connected to prospect theory‘s 
identification of human risk-aversion and preference for the status quo.34 Control is most absent when 
                                                            
31. Abraham Lincoln, ―Address at Sanitary Fair,‖ 18 April 1864. Available at 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1067 (accessed June 1, 2011). A note on quotations. In 
dealing with all texts, and especially pre-modern one‘s with idiosyncratic grammar and spelling, I will silently edit both 
spelling and simple grammar where doing so does not alter the meaning of the text. 
 
32. R.H. Tawney, Equality (New York:  Capricorn Books Putnam, 1961), 208. 
 
33. J. Hope Mason, ―Discussion of ‗Rousseau et Marx,‘‖ in Rousseau after 200 Years: Proceedings of the 
Cambridge Bicentennial Colloquium, ed. R. A. Leigh (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 85.   
 
 
 8  
 
others exercise an arbitrary — in the very specific sense of according to another‘s will — power over 
oneself and one‘s decision.35 It is most obviously absent when that arbitrary will‘s influence is capricious 
or intermittent.   
The desire for control is the human mind‘s desire for order and predictability. There is a happy 
satisfaction when trains run on time. Designed and incredibly efficient at understanding patterns and 
regularity, the human mind simply disdains everything else. The desire for predictability and control 
informs ―the feeling in each person‘s mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with 
whom he sympathizes, would like them to act.‖36 If for no other reason, it is because then we might better 
understand and predict why people behave the way they do.  
Control, as a natural human inclination, does not necessarily mean dominance or dominion. It is 
not necessarily a will to power. Nor, does it really mean individual power. Like the transcendentalists 
and romantics emphasize, one can create control over one‘s life by departing society and living the life 
of a hermit. A recluse‘s control is discovered in the absence of foreign domination and the perfect 
experience of effective will.  
One can also create control over one‘s environment by submitting to another‘s more effective 
authority. When countries face chaos, despots sing stability‘s siren song. For at the core of every person‘s 
heart is the desire to be well-governed, and well-governed in the right way. Irving Kristol smacked at this idea 
when he correctly suggested, ―people have always preferred strong government to weak government, although 
they certainly have no liking for anything that smacks of overly intrusive government.‖37 Governed control is 
better than anarchy, but control of me in ways objectionable becomes control over me, becomes tyranny.  
 
 
                                                            
34. See, for example, Robert Jervis, ―The Implications of Prospect Theory for Human Nature and Values,‖ 
Political Psychology 25, no. 2 (April, 2004): 163-176. 
 
35. This will be the meaning of the term arbitrary throughout the paper. It is used exclusively in the sense of 
according to another‘s dictates, and carries none of the usually connotations involving randomness or caprice. 
 
36. Stefan Collini, introduction in On Liberty and Other Writings by John Stuart Mill (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 9. 
 
37. Irving Kristol, ―The Neoconservative Persuasion,‖ The Weekly Standard, August 25, 2003, Available at 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/000tzmlw.asp  (accessed June 1, 2011). 
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FROM CHAOS TO PARADOX 
Control stands against chaos. Although the two are not properly opposites, they do exist in a 
certain tension with each other. If control is associated with regularity and order, chaos is the apparent 
absence of both. Chaos is the jumble, the confusion, the raucous commotion. Even when separate actions 
are governed by ironclad rules of motion, if they each act differently, or separately, they quickly succumb 
to a chaotic order, a pattern of behavior which the human mind simply cannot comprehend or countenance.  
Just like control is a prime motivator of the human condition, chaos comes to symbolize the 
limitations and ultimate impotence of humanity. As such, most find it unseemly and abhorrent. Chaos 
involves risk because prediction becomes impossible. It goes against every scientific imperative known 
to the human mind. We are a species born to classify, to order, to understand the forces of the universe 
and bring them to bear.  Chaos complicates, defies and prohibits control. In the final calculus, what is 
good is reckoned to exist with order, predictability and harmony; what is bad is chaotic, confused, 
irrational. Chaos is simply uncivilized. 
The great irony, however, is that our society is founded on chaos. Modern liberal social orders are 
marked by the sheer amount of uncoordinated, seemingly random activity going this way and that. People 
get in each other‘s way; they respond loudly and unpredictably; they worship in a thousand different ways 
to a hundred different gods. In some respects liberalism is diversity, and diversity is chaos.  
Freedom by contrast is about power and control. When people say they want freedom; what they 
mean is they want control over their lives. They want control over their person, free from capricious 
imprisonment or torture. They not only want control over choices, but the environment in which those 
choices are made. Freedom is the taming of the great forces of chaos that frustrate and confound our 
attempts at control. Though we may have many things in liberal society, control is not one of them. The 
irony is in our free societies, we are doomed to be unfree.  
WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 
With that central paradox in view, this project begins with an admittedly incomplete and cursory 
survey of the history of freedom as an idea, covering a few of the many ways both trained thinkers and 
laymen have deployed the concept of freedom. Specifically, I try to highlight the way that freedom has 
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been conceptualized as types of social and individual sovereignty, autonomy and moral control across a 
number of domains of discussion. 
In the second part, I offer an analysis of these usages, suggesting that more often than not, the 
central demand of freedom is a plea for control. Freedom in its myriad uses is ultimately an eternal 
struggle for ordered sovereignty, a self-government committed and maintained by a conscious self 
without interference. In the earliest periods of development, the state offered the principle obstacle to 
self-control and so negative liberty barriers were constructed to carve out ever-larger spaces where 
individual sovereignty is inviolate. As even those restrictions proved inadequate to secure individual 
self-government in sufficient quantities, liberals and socialists alike turned to social and economic 
institutions that exerted power over the autonomous, independent self. But none have managed to offer 
freedom goods to any satisfying degree.   
The final part further explores the chaos at the heart of liberalism, and then in the final chapter, 
juxtaposes the idea of freedom as control with society as chaos. Principally, I suggest there is a far greater 
tension between liberalism and freedom than is commonly understood. And freedom, more generally, is a 
fugitive concept that can only exist in perfectly autarkic or perfectly autocratic regimes. Liberalism, which 
is marked by the dismantling of control structures, far from destroying power or offering control of the self, 





PART ONE:  FREEDOM, POWER AND SOVEREIGNTY 
Chapter I 
Sovereign Freedom 
It is often said an idea cannot exist without its opposite. So it is with freedom that it is best 
understood, and was born, in the presence and threat of its opposite, slavery.1  Most histories of freedom 
place its origins as a core philosophical concept in ancient Greece at the onset of war from the east.2  
According to Max Pohlenz, a German chronicler of the history of Greek freedom, the Greco-
Persian Wars of the early 5th century BCE offered the supreme defining experience for Greek culture and 
thought. The monumental threat from the Persian armies of Darius I, and later Xerxes I, fertilized an 
exploration of freedom as the defining characteristic of humanity.3 The Greeks began using eleutheria 
(ἐλευθερία) to describe the stakes: ―not being enslaved, of course, and not being ruled by foreign 
domination.‖4 With the threat of foreign occupation, freedom for the ancient Greeks became intensely 
interwoven with notions of sovereignty and self-determination.5 For example, when Greek scholars like 
Herodotus described the free Greek people, he specifically highlighted their independence from foreign 
rule and influence.6 To further the contrast, the Greeks emphasized the differences between the two 
societies, and specifically the Greek ―lawful and impersonal rather than arbitrary and despotic rule [of the 
Persian kings], open and collegial public life…rather than a sacred, inaccessible priest-king.‖7 The ancient 
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freedom as sovereignty, law and independence developed with the strength and struggle of the individual 
city-states. After the Person War, this emphasis on sovereignty and freedom kept the various city-states at 
odds, and encouraged the competition between them, resulting for example in the Peloponnesian War.8 
Though Hannah Arendt discusses this idea more in the context of individuals, her understanding 
of the primacy of isonomy is also instructive in the way it interacts with the fundamental understanding of 
freedom as sovereignty. Isonomy, or isonomia (ἰσονομία), the principle element of freedom for the Greeks, 
emphasized ―conditions of no-rule, without a division between rulers and ruled.‖9 The idea has obvious 
connections with democracy, where the people who rule are the same as those that are ruled. This current is 
especially strong today in republican democratic theory, and strongest with Rousseau.10 The Greek freedom 
was more specifically social than we are given to thinking today, and so the isonomy they sought was 
closely tied with the sovereignty and independence of the polis. It carries connotations of sovereign 
equality of the city-state and signifies no other entity stands above it.11  
The Greek idea of freedom was also reflected in their word for politics. The Greek politeia 
(πολιτεία), an ambiguous term which can refer generally to a government, to specific forms of government, 
a given constitution or the politics surrounding, nevertheless almost universally carries with it references to 
―a way of life that a people worked out by itself for itself.‖12 In other words, the politeia of a free polis 
could not be instilled from outside or above. This is what Aristotle means when he ―identifies freedom as 
the leading democratic principle and includes in it both equal sharing in the government of the state and 
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also the freedom to live as one likes.‖13 To live as one likes is not, individual autonomy or freedom to act, it 
is the ability of the collective community to determine how it shall live. It was something internal and 
unique to a specific social body, a mode of behavior that was distinctly its own.  
The urge to independence and sovereignty also extended beyond simple political domination, and 
also cautioned the Greeks away from excessive interdependence. As Aristotle suggests in Book VI of 
Politics self-sufficiency was a crucial element of the free demos.14 Without it, without the strength of 
military virtue and the abilities to provide for needs from within, weaknesses eventually lead to 
dependence, which in turned generated relations of subordination or subjugation.15  
SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUAL 
Modern scholarship has also widely argued the Greek understanding of social freedom precluded 
an understanding of individual liberty beyond what a person enjoyed in his share of the social 
sovereignty.16 John Stuart Mill mused personal liberty and freedom was ―a mode of thinking which may 
have been admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies, in constant peril of being 
subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion, and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and 
self-command might so easily be fatal.‖17 Isaiah Berlin, likewise, argues any society beset by insufficient 
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―food, warmth, shelter, and minimum degree of security can scarcely be expected to concern themselves 
with freedom of contract or of the press,‖ in other words the individual freedom as rights.18 
Greek society, and ancient life generally, was exactly so precarious, and individual claims to 
freedom were often limited to one‘s share in, or benefit from, the corporate, social sovereignty.  
This was true for all the Greek states, but was especially true in Athens. Often mistaken for the norm 
in ancient Greece, Athenian freedom is idiosyncratic for its time, with a special emphasis on democracy. It is 
instructive, however, for the way the Athenian government, set apart by its emphasis on democracy and 
individual autonomy, still discussed both in the language of social sovereignty. The close conceptual ties 
between freedom and democracy were first drawn here in ancient Athens, in a way that occurs again and 
again in modern thought. As Aristotle acknowledges in Politics, freedom (as something distinct from but 
ultimately the end of democracy) is an approximation of individual sovereignty, ―the claim to be ruled by 
none, if possible, or, if this is impossible to rule and be ruled in turns.‖19 It is this rotation in office, in the 
place of direct democracy, which is the heart of ―living as one wants.‖20 From freedom as sovereignty for the 
polis to rule of the polis by democracy, emphasized the importance of sovereignty by metaphor and offered 
individuals to share in the sovereignty of the state, either directly or through lot.21  
The freedom of the ancients, then, from both a social and individual perspective was associated 
with sovereignty. As Benjamin Constant pointed out in his iconic lecture on the difference between the 
modern and ancient forms of freedom, ―the later consisted in exercising collectively, but directly, several 
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parts of the complete sovereignty.‖22 A conception shared by the Greeks and Romans, this ancient freedom 
was both political and personal, but ultimately was about the sovereignty of the state.23 Freedom was the 
communal understanding and experience of the state‘s self-determination; it was ―an active and constant 
participation in collective power.‖24 In Thucydides‘ The Peloponnesian War, Pericles‘ funeral speech 
extols Athenian government for the ways in which the Athenian allows freedom for all, not just a 
privileged few, to serve the interests of the state.25 
Habermas and Rawls follow the same lines of thought, equating democratic principles and 
government with this very specific form of ancient freedom, which Habermas describes as ―the political 
rights of participation and communication that make possible the citizens‘ exercise of self-determination.‖26 
For the city-state, freedom meant the absence of a higher imperial power. For the individual, it meant some 
kind of share in that freedom. For most of the Greek states, unenamored with democracy, it was in being a 
part of a state that was governed by its own essence and traditions. For the democratic states, and especially 
Athens, it was the participation in government and one‘s part in the determination of what that essence 
was.27 Either way, the idea was linked essentially to the independence and sovereignty of the state. It was 
the collective right of the supreme power, and it was intimately tied with his status.28 Not just man‘s 
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survival and well-being but his freedom depended on the security and prosperity of the state. The one was 
the other. If the state lost its independence, so did the man.29  
Divorced from liberalism‘s emphasis on individuality, the ancient freedom was not only 
collectivist in practice but in origin. Today‘s liberal freedom treats the state as ―a human organization 
shaped by history, which [is] only a means to an end if not indeed a necessary evil.‖30 The power of the 
state is held at bay by individual‘s natural, inherent rights to liberty and autonomy. The ancients, however, 
had no understanding of inherent or individual rights. Far from it, for the ancients, individual equality and 
freedom were ―conventional and artificial, the products of human effort and qualities of the man-made 
world.‖31 As Arendt explains, the public space artificially made people individually equal, so they might 
take part in sovereignty together.  
If the ancients had any concept of individual liberty apart from the equality and sovereignty of 
the public square, it was particularly thin and much later in origin.32 Instead, the internal sovereignty of 
the state, the right of the rulers to rule, over society was absolute. As Constant reads, ancient ―men 
were…merely machines, whose gears and cog-wheels where regulated by the law.‖33 J.S. Mill likewise 
noticed, ―the ancient commonwealths thought themselves entitled to practice…the regulation of every 
part of private conduct by public authority, on the ground that the State had the deep interest in the 
whole bodily and mental discipline of every one of its citizens.‖34 As noted above, the precarious 
independence and survival of the state was the principal concern, and the state practiced its authority on 
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SPARTA AND ATHENS 
This general principle exhibits degrees of realization in practice, as Constant notes in the disparity 
between the private freedoms of Sparta and Athens.35 According to the discussion, the Spartan freedom was 
nothing more than the independence of his motherland. To achieve that end, the Spartans subjected 
themselves to ―a way of life that placed man from the cradle to the grave under the control of the state and 
compelled him to military discipline.‖36 Pohlenz described the Spartan kosmos as a ―totalitarian state which 
took possession of the whole man, so pressing his interests into service that no room was left for any 
private life of his own.‖37 The Athenians by contrast, though extolling the same measure of state 
independence, nevertheless made room for a separation between the public and private spheres.  
Certainly, as a matter of policy, though certainly not constitution, personal autonomy was 
realized in Athens. As Plutarch notes, ―In Athens everyone could live as he liked; in Sparta that was 
permitted to nobody.‖38 As Pericles describes in the Funeral Oration, Athenians are ―far from exercising 
a jealous surveillance over each other.‖39 Elsewhere, he remarks, ―freely we conduct not only our public 
life but also our everyday dealings with one another.‖40 In both Plutarch and Pericles‘s words, it would 
appear the Athenians understood freedom as the independence of individuals from the collective will, 
just as we might today.  
It is important not to take this to mean the idea of individual freedom was more than slightly 
developed in ancient Greece, as a few scholars have argued.41 The freedoms Pericles mentions first, for 
example, are distinctly social and political in form. They involve ―advancement in public life fall[ing] to 
reputation for capacity‖ and how ―if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of 
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his condition.‖42 Where he does mention private life, it is with the distinct feeling, as Berlin describes, that 
Pericles is saying  Athenians ―perform their civic duty out of love for their polis, without needing to be 
coerced, and not under the goads and whips of savage laws or taskmasters (as in Sparta or Persia).‖43 So 
where the discipline and order of Sparta had to be maintained through a totalitarian control, in Athens the 
same order and devotion was authentic and natural. As we understand today, and as the Athenians 
understood then, that meant their devotion and their state was freer.  
The point, of course, is that this liberty was a matter of choice, a matter of chosen policy as a 
means of furthering a stronger, wiser state. It was not determined philosophically. There was no 
understanding of absolute right behind it.44 Instead, individual liberty operated to make the city of Athens 
stronger, by encouraging a greater devotion to the state. The citizens more perfectly felt their place in 
society and had more to lose in their sovereignty. Individual autonomy was a method of making Athenian 
sovereignty stronger and more palpable. The notion of individual right was simply not a part of Greek 
culture, or any ancient civilization, in any meaningful way.45  
Furthermore, to call their freedom unregulated would be a travesty because the state retained 
incredible power over its citizens. Pericles elaborates on the ultimate authority of the state later in the 
funeral speech when he remarks, ―all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens. 
Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws.‖46 The fear of 
state, with its terrible retribution and authority, still maintained the order of society. At any moment, 
Athenian freedom, protected by far less than even barriers of parchment, might be broken at the public‘s 
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whim. As Constant contends, the Athenian citizen, despite his autonomy, was still very much ―subservient 
to the supremacy of the social body in Athens.‖47 This social power was omnipotent and plenipotentiary.  
The Athenian body politic constrained and guided man‘s freedom, carving out very specific, 
often miniscule, spaces for what we might call private, autonomous free action. 48 As part of the 
sovereign power, an individual citizen ―interrogated, dismissed, condemned, beggared, exiled or 
sentenced to death his magistrates and superiors,‖ but by the same token was subject to the absolute 
―discretionary will of the whole to which he belonged.‖49 Constant, and others, point to the practice of 
ostracism as a particular harsh example on the supreme authority of the state. 50 As Richard Mulgan 
explains, ostracism whereby an individual was forced away from the city for 10 years, though certainly 
more civilized than capital punishment or permanent banishment, was nevertheless marked by its brutal 
absence of fairness and process. Ostracism ―required no specific charge…and no right of defense or 
appeal was allowed. People ostracized were exiled solely on the ground that the members of the 
assembly wished to be rid of them.‖51 The trial of Socrates only further highlights the social arbitrariness 
at play in ancient Greece.52 
 The Greeks, the Athenians in particular, did not see the two characterizations of their society as 
free and yet subject to such awesome social power as a contradiction. The Greeks, like the Romans, 
understood individual autonomy as the ability to act where the law was silent. Where the body politic had 
yet to legislate, the individual was free to act as he pleased. The Greeks and Romans emphasized man‘s 
―strong urge to be master of his fate‖ within the realm of the law‘s tacit regulation.53 They did not 
understand this urge to be freedom per se, instead it was more a sense of autonomy.  
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Individual liberty, to the extent that it existed, was a confined space delimited by a vast collection 
of forces that contained personal action. Even in this space, as Pericles suggests, the social power remained 
vigilant. Unrestricted by due process, and with no limit to post facto action, the will of the state remained a 
powerful regulating power. Even in the context of the law‘s silence, the state remained a great power bound 
to come crashing down at any moment.    
This perspective was indicative of the overall ancient understanding of man‘s place in the world. 
Man existed in an awesome, often cruel world, where an array of dangers and powers worked against 
man‘s individual or social will, threatening to not just destroy his freedom, but imminent destruction. As 
Pohlenz describes, 
He [the ancient man] sees the dangers that threaten him. But his 
essential feeling is not a fear that puts him on the defensive, but a 
positive will to live, an urge to shape his life within the limits imposed 
upon him by the order of the universe, according to his own nature and 
his own will…To mortal man, the gods are able to decree physical 
death; but even then there is one thing of which they cannot deprive 
him, the right and the power to act as he himself freely decides. He has 
no power to modify the outward march of events. But within himself 
he remains master of his decisions.54 
 
The space he controlled was tiny, and there was nothing keeping the gods or the power of the state of 
encroaching in on it, but the feeling and desire for power was nevertheless real.  
It is in this description that the importance of individual power and control as elements of freedom 
become dramatically clear. The desire to possess control is obvious enough in the freedom of social 
sovereignty for the city states; it is the power for a polity to determine its own way of life without 
interference. For the individual, the story was so much more complicated in a world where individual 
control was all but impossible. The powerful forces beyond him were simply too much to contend against. 
As human knowledge and technological capacity has grown, so has the extent of his power. It became 
easier and easier to understand freedom not as social control and stability, but as an individual power 
effectively held against others. We no longer are in awe of the universe, and so are not inclined to tolerate 
its vicissitudes. Unlike the ancient, we are more confident and secure in our power, and so make far greater 
demands on our individual power and freedom.    
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FREEDOM IN THE LAW 
 This change in emphasis, from absolute social power to increasing individual power is often 
associated with the influence of Roman jurisprudence. The Romans, with more emphasis on legal process and 
law, exercised authority over free individuals in a less capricious, arbitrary manner than the Greeks.55 Yet, this 
does not mean the Roman‘s had any more developed notion of individual freedom. The Roman ―sense of 
individual political liberty seems to have been weak beside that of the corporate liberty of the whole Roman 
people,‖ just like the Greeks‘.56 But, in the rule of law, and the emphasis on process and codification, 
however, they discovered and celebrated an individual autonomy unlike the kind practiced even in Athens.  
Other similarities also exist. Roman law, according to Florentinus in Institutiones, comprehended 
freedom in a very similar way to the Greek construction, as the ―ability to do what one wishes, except if it is 
prevented…by law.‖57 This is a conception, also shared later by Hobbes in Leviathan, where the ability to act 
freely is understood to exist only where the law does not specifically proscribe activity.58 The sovereign for 
Hobbes, the law for Romans, and the polis for the Greeks, could regulate (almost) any form of activity.59  
The contribution of Roman law, however, was a far greater enunciation, and gradation, of an 
individual‘s position and power within the social arrangement. Gary Reed offers a compelling reading of 
the history of freedom that emphasizes the role of social and legal belonging. According to his reading, the 
word freedom evolved beyond its original meanings, which referred to varieties of plants and animals,60 to 
include ―belonging to an ethnic stock designated by a metaphor of vegetal growth.‖61  In this earliest stage, 
freedom was a measure of belonging by birth to a given lineage and included understandings of the 
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privileges as well as behavioral expectations for those who belonged. A person was free because he 
belonged in the same way that a plant belongs to its kingdom, genus or variety. When the importance of the 
sovereign city-state developed, the notion of sovereignty again made the metaphorical jump so that a free 
person was one who belonged to, and in some places participated in, the sovereign governance.  
Unlike the sovereign citizen, the stranger and slave were not free because they could not know 
true belonging.62 They were apart, alien and separate.63 In its final sense, with the growth of citizenship, 
freedom became something one could acquire. One could cease to be a stranger, become a free citizen.64  
In this understanding, rights and freedom are related in the reverse of how they are today. Rights 
do not make one free. Instead, rights and liberties belong to a man because he is free.65 Because one 
belonged, one had specific entitlements to social and political powers. The idea that rights and freedoms are 
linked to belonging continued well into the late Enlightenment. As Arendt explains, for example, the 
patriots of the American revolutions,  
though quite sure that what they claimed from England were ‗the rights 
of Englishmen‘, [they] could no longer think of themselves in terms of 
‗a nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates‘ (Burke); even 
the trickle of non-English and non-British stock in their midst was 
enough to remind them: ‗Whether you be English, Irish, Germans, or 
Swedes,…you are entitled to all the liberties of Englishmen and the 
freedom of this constitution. What they were saying and proclaiming 
was in fact that those rights which up to now had been enjoyed only by 
Englishmen should be enjoyed in the future by all men.66 
 
This underscores just how new the idea of universal freedom really is. Not just within populations, that 
is between free persons and slaves, but across civilizations as well. For the longest time, the idea of 
freedom was so closely associated with the idea of belonging, and specifically belonging to a sovereign, 
independent nation. 
In Rome, these distinctions took a very real form in the Roman ius personarum (law of persons) 
that delineated the various powers, obligations and immunities of slaves, freemen and citizens. If nothing 
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else, the law of status and freedom as belonging resulted in an understanding, nearly universal in the 
ancient world, that freedom was the exception instead of the rule. There was no universal right in practice 
or rhetoric. For example, the Romans, like the Athenians, were ―committed to freedom and equality at 
home,‖ they practiced a ―ruthless control abroad.‖67 Likewise, though there was no shortage of theoretical 
justifications for slavery in the ancient world, there appears to be no push among ancients for the abolition 
of slavery.68 Those who did not belong, those who were not free, could make no claim to power over 
themselves or others.  
The law played a large role in understandings of freedom and belonging in the ancient world, 
necessitated in part by the institution of slavery. As Pohlenz asserts, ―the concept of freedom implies its 
antithesis…The awareness of freedom could only arise in a place where men lived together with others 
who were not independent but had a master over them whom they served and who controlled their lives.‖69 
And, slavery in the ancient world was ubiquitous. As much as a tenth of the Roman Empire‘s 50 or 60 
million people might have been slaves, with a large portion of them living in Italy.70 As mentioned before, 
the development of freedom is best felt in an environment marked by its opposite; and throughout the 
ancient world, ―men lived together with others who were not independent but had a master over them 
whom they served and who controlled their lives.‖71 Like Arendt‘s interpretation of Greek freedom as 
something artificially built and constructed, the Romans tended to emphasize the artificiality of slavery.72 It 
was a strictly social construct.73 As Florentinus continues after his definition of freedom, he defines slavery 
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as ―an institution of the law of nations whereby, contrary to nature, a person is made subject to another‘s 
ownership,‖74 Likewise, Gaius spells out, ―slaves are in the power (in potestate) of their owners. This 
power comes from the law of nations; for uniformly among all peoples we can observe that owners have 
the power of life and death over their slaves.‖75 The slave was subject to the artificial power of his master. 
These distinctions also existed among citizens, and governed familial relations as well. Roman law 
gave the male head of a family (the pater familias) a range of powers (the patria potestas) over those in 
potestate, including the power of life and death (vitae necisque potestas). It was the same power Gaius had 
suggested the master held over the slave. The father exercised ―absolute mastery…over his children.‖76 As 
the oft-quoted Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote, it was a power that lasted for the life of the father.77 Even 
free adult children, and their children, remained under their father‘s power. The one exception was a 
married daughter, who fell within the power of her husband.78 Those in potestate could not own land, marry 
or exercise many other qualities of independence, without their father‘s permission. His authority was 
absolute, with no recourse to the higher authority. The father ―was at liberty to imprison him [his children], 
flog him, to keep him prisoner working on the farm, and to kill him.‖79 The Romans moreover, understood 
the extraordinary nature of the patria potestas, and acknowledged it was an entirely artificial construction, 
even if rooted in history. It was an invention of Roman law. So where the Romans understood that filial 
obligation and devotion was characteristic of all societies, only the Roman‘s had anything similar to the 
patria potestas.80  
It is a historical irony that the very culture that has become exemplar of liberty, the rule of law and 
due process, operated under a code of the very arbitrary, even capricious, patria potestas. The love of one‘s 
children did not regulate the patria potestas. (The love and affection parents feel for their children is a 
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relatively new invention.81) In the early imperial period, the father‘s power did come ―to encompass a 
father‘s duty to protect those in his power.‖82 As Richard Saller points out, though that might appear to be 
progress, ―to the great sixtheenth-century political theorist of absolute sovereignty, Jean Bodin, it was a 
fundamental cause of the breakdown of good order in the Roman empire.‖83 For Bodin and others, the 
regulating influence of the patria potestas was crucial for the regulation of Roman society. It was the 
control and order, which kept the empire together, and its gradual decline, the weakening of the familial 
bond, lead to the decline of the whole society from within.84 
One of the few exceptions to the patria potestas highlights the chief connection between freedom, 
citizenship and public participation for ancient peoples. The father‘s power never extended to one‘s public 
life. Though a father certainly had a wide range of option for controlling his children in office, according to 
Pomponius, he could not directly affect the participation in legal affairs or pursuit of office.85  
Finally, Roman law envisioned another kind of liberty. Where individual freedom was usually 
understood as the ability to act where the law did not regulate action, especially in the later Empire, it 
became more and more common for privileged men to be exempt from the various public duties. These 
exemptions were granted by law, and most often excluded wealthy men from the sodida munera (shameful 
burdens), legally mandated taxes of labor ―such as making bread for the army, providing animals for the 
postal service, housing officials on their journeys, and maintaining public works.‖86 These privileges began 
carving out a new sense of liberty as not the silence of the law, but an exemption from it.  
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This was especially true of the various temples and religious orders, which were exempt not only 
from the sodida munera but from taxation as well. The Roman Catholic Church steadfastly defended these 
exemptions well into the Middle Ages as the power of the Empire waned and the power of regional 
governors and kings slowly grew.  
To many, the story of modern liberty in Europe begins in these exemptions from taxation, and 
continues when the emperor Constantine moved the Roman capital to modern-day Istanbul.87 The result 
was a magnificent power vacuum in the West, a fact confirmed by the rapid disintegration of the Western 
empire. The collapse of the Roman Empire left a vast number of smaller political entities in its place, yet 
despite pretentions of grandeur, none had the strength to extend its control very far.  
The Catholic Church centered in Rome played these groups against each other, usual the precedents 
of preferential exemption to develop into a real political player in Europe. As a result, the Church successfully 
and ―tenaciously opposed the power of the state and thus placed limits on monarchs‘ rule.‖88 It large, tax-
exempt land wealth across Europe, empowered the church with both material means and material interest in 
keeping the various state powers weak. Its traditional exemption from taxation and variety of other legal 
immunities enabled it to maintain an independent power base. With the collapse of the Roman Empire in the 
West, and the rise of a massively powerful nonstate organization in its place, for the first time, an organization 
strong enough to challenge a state authority ―cracked the edifice of state power, and in the nooks and crannies 
individual liberty began to grow.‖89 It was in this power struggle between the states of Europe and Church, 
and the various kings and barons of the realm, in J.S. Mill‘s words, that ―the struggle between liberty and 
authority…[became] the most conspicuous feature‖ of history.90  
 These church immunities also set the precedent for the privileges in the temporal authority as well. 
It was because of the traditional ecclesiastical prerogatives against the state that ―it became possible in 
England to conceive of the territorial liberties of the barons as a class. The ecclesiastical immunity gave to 
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the sense of liberty the element of freedom from official interference within a defined territory.‖91 These 
rights not only took the form of specific limits to governmental power, namely the power to tax, but also in 
expansions of the barons‘ authority to act independently. It was in this period that political liberty became 
more ―a matter of doing, not being, the exercise of power rather than the possession of status.‖92 The usages 
of the very words shifted from belonging to practice. Liberty became the privilege of action for the landed 
elite, and ―could refer to the land as well as to the freedom.‖93 So, a lord had the freedom to exercise 
political power across his liberty, granted to him from either the force of his dominion against other would-
be rulers or by grant from some higher political figure.  
This autonomy was essentially to the advancement of freedom. From the land, and their authority 
over it, the barons and lords had access to independent sources of wealth and power. Until the very latest 
feudal stages, most kings, the lords of the lords, were kings in name only. The political game they played was 
aimed at wresting resources, borrowing money and recruiting troops from their constituent aristocrats. In this 
way, ―Europe‘s landed elite became an aristocracy with power, money, and legitimacy — a far cry from the 
groveling and dependent courtier-nobles in other parts of the world.‖94 This was vital to political freedom 
because the lords, in exchange for resources to the king, demanded absolute, unalienable exemptions from his 
authority. As time passed, these exemptions became automatic, proforma, constituting rituals in coronations 
and regular public decrees. In England, they were also codified in documents such as Magna Carta.95 The 
history of freedom, then, owes largely to this ability of the elite to maintain control over their territories and 
their ability to provide their own ―protection against the tyranny of the [higher] political rulers.‖96 
These rights moreover begin to take individual character through the individual barons. In some 
instances, special towns were give ―free customs,‖ privileges applying to the many individuals who 
inhabited the towns which included everything from the right to be sued only in special courts and 
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immunity from tolls. As the power of the central monarchies increased through the 13th and 14th centuries, 
it was the special powers of the barons that began filter down to individual free citizens. A man imprisoned 
by the king or his officers, could sue for release because the king had violated the baron‘s privilege to keep 
prisons.97 The rights of the prisoner himself are of little concern.  
The rise of liberty and freedom in Europe, then, is inexorably linked to both religious and 
temporal power struggles. No religious or state authority was ever able to exert a universal or preponderant 
power. As Mill remarks in regard to the various religious sects that developed after the Reformation, the 
various ―minorities, seeing that they had no chance of becoming majorities; were under the necessity of 
pleading to those whom they could not convert, for permission to differ.‖98 Similarly, as a new class of 
independent gentry developed in the mercantile classes, the rights of the landed gentry took an even greater 
universal feel.99 Freedom was no longer realized in participation in the sovereignty of the state, it was the 
sovereignty of the baron beyond it. It had become immunities from the temporal and religious authority that 
had constrained human action in the preceding millennia. Liberty was something a man held against the 
power of another, rather enjoyed with him. 
Freedom still only pertained only to a select few, still carried notions of belonging, whether the 
ancient citizen, the landed baron, the wise or men of the cloth.100 It was his privilege, his right to an 
authority and sovereignty distinctly his own. It was for another time to determine the ultimate implications 
of this trend and the discovery of freedom as we commonly understand it today. 
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Sovereignty Beyond the State 
 Though by the end of the Middle Ages freedom had become something more than just the 
sovereignty of the state, the enjoyment of free privilege was still reserved to the upper echelons of society. 
Status freedom still operated to separate those who enjoyed participation in sovereignty and those who did 
not. The liberties of the lords and barons of Europe had successfully grown large enough to include both 
the positive experience of sovereignty and individual immunities from higher powers.  
Toward the end of the Enlightenment, however, with the rise of new loci of power in the merchant 
and industrial classes there was an expansion of interest in liberty, this time largely unlimited by status 
freedom. Because the new sources of wealth, and hence power, emanated from individuals and not the 
land, discussions of individual autonomy began to take on a universal character. The emphasis shifted 
largely from the sovereignty of states and elite rulers to the freedom of individuals as the new centers of 
power searched out for ever-greater spaces of self-direction. By necessity, however, the new freedom was 
not the sovereignty to make one‘s own law or state but was a free self-mastery within the state. 
J.S. Mill‘s On Liberty is the classic liberal enunciation of political liberty. Few other works are 
given so much devoted study; the sheer volume of material critiquing, defending, or refining Mill‘s 
exposition approaches insanity.1 Though critical approval of On Liberty in particular and Mill‘s larger 
oeuvre has waxed and waned over time, no single speaker has more successfully or more eloquently 
marked out ―the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the 
individual.‖2 And although his theory is far from actively practiced, Mill is widely credited with 
bequeathing to the modern age ―the idea of the free and sovereign individual.‖3 His work envisions a vast 
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region of space for man‘s parochial freedom, marked by the conspicuous absence of both statutory and 
social constraints on individual activity.  
Mill‘s liberty goes beyond just the state‘s influence upon individual action. Limitations to state 
power had been won over the centuries by the nobles, and particularly in England, had largely trickled 
down by the 19th century. Unlike earlier and more traditional views of political freedom, Mill worries more 
about extra-governmental forces that constrain autonomy and individuality.4 So though the few formal 
political and economic restraints remained were quickly falling away, powerful social mores and 
requirements ―were many, and often onerous.‖5 Freedom from an arbitrary or capricious government is not 
enough, he says, ―there needs [to be] protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and 
feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and 
practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them.‖6 The social power Mill recognizes as a new 
form of tyranny is the chief impetus for writing On Liberty.7  
For Mill the chief problem with social pressures, whether wholly social or given form in law, is 
the way such pressure limits and destroys individuality. As he remarks elsewhere, commenting on 
communism, Mill wonders whether under socialist systems ―any asylum [is] left for individuality of 
character; whether public opinion would not be a tyrannical yoke; whether the absolute dependence of each 
on all, and the surveillance of each by all, would not grind all down into a tame uniformity of thoughts, 
feelings, and actions.‖8 Because particular mixes of traits and interests are so unique to each individual, 
societies marked by autonomy and complete, free choice are necessarily marked by variety and 
individuality. These two traits, Mill continues, work in unison to better both individual people and the 
society as a whole. ―No society,‖ he says ―in which eccentricity is a matter of reproach can be a wholesome 
state.‖ Notice first, how this is a singularly liberal perspective. Mill is ultimately arguing for individual 
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power and liberty as a means of furthering the social end in language very similar to Adam Smith before 
him. He is arguing fundamentally for the dispersal of power and authority to individual people and against 
the regulation of life styles, ideas and even morality.  
Construing liberty as something far more than independence from governmental authority, but 
political and social self-rule, Mill spends nearly the entirety of On Liberty arguing for an appropriate line to 
distinguish legitimate social and political governance from tyranny. His principle is as simple as it is bold. 
―The sole end for which mankind are warranted…in interfering with the liberty of action…,‖ Mill writes, ―is 
self-protection.‖9 This prohibition covers the entirety of action and forebears any other excuse for interference, 
from the simple majority desire or preferences to appeals to ethics or general well-being. It was, and is still 
today, a radical notion.10 In the first place, Mill creates a rule that sets freedom as the standard and 
interference as the exception, placing the burden of argument on those who would interfere with free action. 
WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE 
One of the chief difficulties for modern readers of Mill is just were the line of sovereignty is 
drawn. Mill tells us ―the individual is not accountable to society…in so far as these concern the interest of 
no person but himself‖ and that only ―for such action as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the 
individual is accountable.‖11 As Gertrude Himmelfarb describes, ―sometimes Mill used words such as 
‗concern‘, ‗affect‘, and ‗regard‘ to express the qualification…[which envision] a far greater latitude to 
society, than the negatively charged words Mull used on other occasions – ‗harm,‘ ‗hurt,‘ ‗injury,‘ 
‗mischief,‘ ‗evil.‘‖12 The ambiguity notwithstanding, the whole context of Mill‘s work suggests the 
criterion for interference is always actions that directly concern or affect others negatively.13 Mill goes to 
lengths to specify the harm must be of the first order, direct and palpable. The mere assault on tastes or 
good sense, even harm one or two degrees removed, is insufficient.14 But even this construction admits a 
                                                            
9. Mill, On Liberty and Other Writings, 13. 
 
10. Himmelfarb, 29. 
 
11. Mill, On Liberty and Other Writings, 94. 
 
12. Himmelfarb, 30. 
 





range of interpretations in practice. Especially in contemporary society, as the line dividing private and 
public acts continues to blur, this point is of particular import.15 
Even Mill recognized this dividing line might prove exceedingly difficult to determine in practice. 
His goal, and victory, was the supremacy of that line as the most common principle. The rest, from 
determining what exactly counts as harm to whether the burden is met, is a matter for the politics of the 
moment. As Isaiah Berlin points out, ―men are largely interdependent, and no man‘s activity is so 
completely private as never to obstruct the lives of others in any way.‖16 This is especially true when one 
considers the space where one person‘s freedom, even in his private activities, can infringe upon 
another‘s.17 The assumption, fundamental to both Mill, Berlin and the range of liberal thinkers, is that 
despite this interrelation, there is some sphere of human activity that is off limits to the political and social 
regulation no matter the level of effect.18  
Not all so-called liberals have shared in this belief. Locke‘s state of nature, for example, appears 
very much akin to Mill‘s understanding of liberty. For Locke, the state of nature is ―a state of perfect 
freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit…without 
asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.‖19 Freedom, within society, for Locke, is 
distinctly circumscribed, and bears far more resemblance to the society Mill rejects than the one he extols. 
Locke describes the social freedom as marked by the rule of law, the right to ―a stranding rule to live by, 
common to every one of that society and made by the legislative power erected in it, a liberty to follow my 
own will in all things where the rule prescribes not, and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, 
unknown, arbitrary will of another man.‖20 In this sense, freedom is the absence of an arbitrary, maybe 
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even capricious will. If one stopped here, there appears to be little difference between Locke and Mill. Both 
require rules be enunciated and fully formed by a legitimate power before they can curtail the actions of 
any individual. Locke, however, places very few limits on the legislative authority. And limits he admits 
primarily encompass the controlling safeguards for life and property, the protection of which was behind 
the formation of society in the first place.21  
Beyond the protections for life and property, Locke is borders on Hobbesian.22 Locke admits a 
whole realm of limitations to thought an action. As he wrote elsewhere, ―No opinions contrary to human 
society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be 
tolerated by the magistrate.‖23 More specifically, though the variety of Christian sects should be 
tolerated, individual immorality was to be squashed at every point. Atheism was a particularly pernicious 
threat because ―promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold 
upon the atheist.‖24 Locke‘s concern was the origin of power and the way the state realized it. He was 
not concerned with the fundamental distribution of that power, with the destruction of sites of power, the 
true hallmarks of modern liberalism.  
DEFENDING DIVERSITY (AND LIBERTY) 
Mill‘s defense of liberty refuses to treat liberty as an end in itself, a strategy with which many 
more conservative thinkers of his time agreed.25 Instead, he opts for a second variety of justification, by 
relying instead on a consequentialist approach that, according to Shaun O‘Dwyer, generally ―justifies 
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liberties and equal rights from the standpoint of their ability to promote ends such as social harmony, 
progress, and prosperity.‖26 For Mill, this justification comes from an adherence to a particular form of 
grand utilitarianism, a ―utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a 
progressive being.‖27 Mill‘s liberty stems from a complete devotion to utilitarian principles, and 
specifically to the ways in which liberty, most often conceptualized as a kind of private autonomy, 
contributes to the progressive improvement of men and ideas.28  
Mill defends liberty on two utilitarian fronts. In the first, liberty promotes aggregate individual 
happiness. Because there is a natural diversity of tastes, interests and predispositions, under Mill‘s thinking, 
no one mode of life is likely to simultaneously suit all of those naturally derived inclinations and only each 
individual is best positioned to understand what mode of life is the best fit. The solution then is openness to 
a experiential variety. This is the essence of Mill‘s oft-quoted definition of ―the only freedom which 
deserves the name…[as] pursuing our own good in our own way.‖29 It is ―framing the plan of our life to 
suit our own character.‖30 Just like the Greeks understood the freedom of the city-state to determine its own 
way, Mill has fully translated the same idea onto the individual. 
Incidentally, though, Mill is associating liberty with the same kind of diversity Plato dismissively 
recognized in democracy, which he called ―an agreeable form of anarchy with plenty of variety and 
equality of a peculiar kind for equals and unequals alike.‖31 Plato‘s wording is eerily reminiscent of Mill‘s, 
even if their conclusions are different. Describing the origin of that diversity, Plato remarks, ―liberty and 
free speech are rife everywhere [in a democracy]; anyone is allowed to do what he likes…every man will 
arrange his own manner of life to suit his pleasure. The result will be a greater variety of individuals than 
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under any other constitution.‖32 Plato rejected such variety as abhorrent and contrary to the dictates of a 
good society. Mill is not only embracing that diversity as a condition of goodness, he is suggesting that 
democratic government alone cannot achieve it. Democratic society and government are about the 
regulation of individual behavior. If nothing else, Mill is advocating the retreat of democratic power to 
allow for the advance of individual sovereignty to determine one‘s mode of life.  
Mill‘s second utilitarian defense extends to the realm of ideas. Liberty, Mill asserts, promotes the 
advancement and perfection of civilization by constructing a marketplace for ideas. Asserting ―the truth of 
an opinion is part of its utility,‖ Mill goes on to suggest that liberty, by allowing a diversity of opinions, is 
the best way to encourage the cultivation of truth.33 In the first instance, freedom of thought allows the 
world to enjoy the fruits of ―promising intellects combined with timid characters, who [otherwise] dare not 
follow out any bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it...be[] considered irreligious or 
immoral.‖34 Here Mill is directly addressing the individual power. These men with timid characters, he 
suggests are blessed with an abundance of brains but plagued by a dearth of personal vigor and command. 
Society, he insists, must retreat to allow this man greater space to operate and express himself. Otherwise, 
any small power he might possess is overrun and consumed by the social force.  
The marketplace of ideas wrought by liberty also offers a means for the dispensing with false or 
partly false ideas. In the ―collision of adverse opinions,‖ as the adherents of conflicting ideas perfect old or 
develop new thoughts to displace others in the collective consciousness.35 The process also forces people to 
discover the reasons for their opinions and to hold those opinions actively rather than as dogma. Mill 
privileges ―real and heartfelt conviction‖ over passive acceptance of an idea.36 A notion, incidentally, that 
even some of Mill‘s contemporary detractors, like Mathew Arnold for instance, agreed with.37 Liberty is the 
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ether mediating the marketplace of ideas. The greater the market created the greater the justification, the better 
society is served by new ideas from those with weak characters and quicker bad ideas tend to die.38  
In this way, Mill‘s argument is not so much about freedom itself but about the best ways to 
advance society. Liberty is worthwhile not on its own merits, but on its ability to advance social progress, 
which is best done in a diverse environment marked by the free contest of ideas. Tyranny, and particularly 
social tyranny, undermines both the diversity and the contest by discouraging difference and declaring 
artificial truths. In both instances, as Berlin summarizes, ―unless the individual is left to live as he 
wishes…civilization [sic] cannot advance.‖39 
Mill places an absolute prohibition on Victorian social engineering and morality laws and is 
advocating what Gertrude Himmelfarb described as ―moral laissez-fairism.‖40 Though equating liberty 
with autonomy from political and social constraints, he is not saying men in society should absolutely 
abandon others to licentiousness. Mill was certainly no moral relativist. What he was constructing, 
however, was a system in which, though moral code operated, no one — much  less a collective of ones 
— could enforce those mores with coercion. He does allow, indeed advocates, mutual concern and a kind 
of moral suasion, whereby one might disarm an evil-doer by  ―remonstrating with him, or reasoning with 
him, or persuading him, or entreating him‖ to live a virtuous life.41  
What exactly the distinctions between social and political tyranny are, Mill never makes clear. 
Divorced by time from heavy-handed Victorian moral suasion, a modern observer might legitimately 
read Mill‘s critique as an indictment of peer-pressure, which pushes individuals to socially accepted 
modes of behavior in the exact homogenization process with which Mill was ultimately concerned. Peer -
pressure, seems to be exactly the kind of social suasion Mill, with his remonstrating, reasoning and 
persuading, seems to be suggesting as the mechanism for moral growth. How to wed non-tyrannical 
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social interest in individual morality with individual autonomy is an enduring problem for Mill, 
especially for those delicate and ―timid characters.‖42  
Under Mill‘s construction, the liberty of one to judge, condemn or even just to pressure, in the 
interest of advancing a social morality, nonetheless threatens to infringe on the liberty of the subject to act 
according to his natural inclinations. For Mill, this is an unfortunate and destructive course of events, but 
ultimately appears to be irresolvable. Society must exert some kinds of regulating pressure on individual 
action, and other than saying society‘s touch must be light there is little one can do to protect the timid 
characters.43 The difficulty also speaks to the central incompatibility of the liberal desire to destroy centers 
of power, pursue individual freedom, and maintain social organization. Because the social power, which in 
Mill‘s case is a type of social morality market, can never truly be broken, moments of real freedom, of 
complete self-sovereignty and possession, are elusive.   
SOCIAL POWER, SOCIAL CONTROL 
Mill‘s liberalism, understandably, invited significant rebuke. Some simply disputed Mill‘s claim 
that social pressures significantly limited individuality. Or if they did, they argued a circumspect view of 
Victorian England revealed more than ample variety, or at least much more than Mill admitted.44   
More common and interesting are the conservative criticisms that specifically extol the regulating 
forces Mill opposed. To varying degrees, these thinkers found custom, tradition and social pressure 
indispensible social devices, without which the very fabric of the social structure might unravel.45 These 
thinkers present a distinctly illiberal need for regulating devices of society. They need forces to hold man 
together, to keep society from spinning out of control. Rejecting Mill‘s advocacy of autonomy from social 
constraints as the essence of freedom, this line of thought most specifically worried how people, particularly 
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the lower classes, might abuse their newfound power. Freed of social regulating forces, people would devolve 
to all variety of evils. Pandemonium and chaos would preempt any high-brow progress Mill promised.  
Mathew Arnold, in the Culture and Anarchy chapter titled ―Doing as One Likes,‖ criticized the 
common notion of freedom as ―an Englishman‘s right to do what he likes; his right to march where he likes, 
meet where he likes, enter where he likes, hoot as he likes, threaten as he likes, smash as he likes.‖46 To 
Arnold, it was nothing more than ―anarchy,‖ and Mill‘s utilitarian justification notwithstanding, he was 
convinced it was an unthinking idolatry, with no larger justification behind it.47 The worship of the machinery 
of freedom exhibited in an unrestricted individualism, Arnold sensed both needlessly low ambitions — he 
thought man was capable of far higher pleasures and achievements than mere liberty — and an extreme 
arrogance that everyone and anyone could, independent of society, discover life‘s sweetness and light.48  
To match this anarchy and push people on to greater discoveries of beauty and truth (it is 
interesting that the end goal of both Arnold and Mill is so similar), Arnold appealed to what Mill rejected: a 
concept of collective society, which he calls the State, to help regulate every Englishman‘s individual 
freedom. For Arnold, the nation, as the collective repository of society‘s wisdom and culture, was ―the 
power most representing the right reason of the nation, and most worth, therefore, of ruling,—of exercising, 
when circumstance require it, authority over us all.‖49 There might be limits to that authority. Arnold, after 
all, was the product of a more liberal world than an absolutist like Locke or Hobbes, but there was a distinct 
role for both society and law to play in molding individual characters and wills.50 It was an institutionalized 
role Mill absolutely detested.  
Arnold‘s conception of freedom is not necessarily different from Mill‘s; they both understood 
freedom as the breakdown of regulating structures, of autonomy from them. The difference is a matter of 
                                                            




48. Stefan Collini, Introduction to Arnold: Culture and Anarchy and Other Writings by Matthew Arnold 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), xix. 
 
49. Arnold, 89. 
50. Arnold, 83. (―the State – the nation in its collective and corporate character, and controlling individual 
wills in the name of an interest wider than that of individuals. We say, what is very true, that this notion is often made 
instrumental to tyranny.‖) 
39 
 
desirability. They maintained different attitudes toward the value of order. Mill, like all liberals, was open 
to possibility of chaos, of disorder and unpredictability. Arnold, by contrast, was unconvinced by the 
religious faith in beneficial outcomes.51 Like most anti-liberals, he was unwilling to abandon the physical, 
identifiable controlling mechanisms of society, lest the entire thing begin to fall apart.       
Likewise, James Fitzjames Stephen takes direct aim at Mill in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. Stephen 
balked at the idea of divorcing action from its moral implications. More than just questioning Mills devotion 
to utilitarian principles, Stephen specifically claims goodness and happiness are diametrically opposed to 
liberty in most cases.52 Like Arnold, Stephen is inclined to believe society and morality are maintained by 
fear, ―fear of the law of the land…by fear of the disapprobation of their neighbors…by the fear of punishment 
in a future state of existence, which is the religious sanction.‖53 Mill‘s theory, Stephen decries, attacks the 
notion of morality and God itself, reasoning ―A God who punishes anyone at all, except for the purpose of 
protecting others, would, upon his [Mill‘s] principles, be a tyrant trampling on liberty.‖54 For Stephen and so 
many others, these sources of authority and power are necessary and virtuous. As Stephen describes, ―to obey 
a real superior, to submit to a real necessity and make the best of it in good part, is one of the most important 
of all virtues — a virtue absolutely essential to the attainment of anything great and lasting.‖55 By destroying 
these obvious sources of obedience, Stephen accused Mill of undermining the progress, society and order. 
 Between Mill and his illiberal detractors, the dispute is less about the meaning of freedom as 
autonomy and more about whether it produces the progressive ends he promises. In this way, the argument 
is more about liberal chaos than it is about freedom. Arnold and Stephen prefer a world of benevolent, 
inspired subjugation to authority. But as Stephen suggests, that submission is not freedom; it is another 
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virtue entirely. The prime target of Stephen‘s rebuke is a rejection of the idea that people acting 
autonomously can create a better society. Only divine guidance or elite wisdom can do that.   
FREEDOM — ARE YOU POSITIVE? 
Arnold and Stephen, of course, are not alone in privileging other values over freedom. Others go 
even further in their rejection of freedom as autonomous action from sources of power and control. In fact, 
from the very birth of the idea, many philosophers have tried to redefine the concept as a kind of control.56 
Rousseau, Kant and Hegel are some of the most prominent in this party, moving from the proposition that 
freedom is a moral and political good or a moral and political right to the quite different proposition that 
person and actions are free only to the extent that they are morally good and their actions morally right.‖57 
Where Arnold and Stephen merely wish for more complete social government than Mill to affect a better 
society within more limited freedoms, in effect disagreeing on how much negative liberty is desirable, the 
advocates of positive freedom, as Berlin understands it, actually re-conceptualize freedom as the discovery 
and practice of virtue.   
As Isaiah Berlin famously expounded in his ―Two Concepts of Liberty,‖ this tradition of freedom 
is totally apart from Mill‘s negative conception of liberty. Berlin‘s thorough and lucid description of an old 
dichotomy between positive and negative freedom sparked a furious debate about the existence and 
legitimacy of two ―concepts‖ of freedom. Berlin identified two primary meanings of freedom: a negative 
sense, associated with Mill and the vast array of liberal institutions, which rested on the absence of 
restraint; and a positive, which emphasized the self-mastery and discovery.58  
The negative liberty he describes is generally the most familiar to us, involving the ―simply the 
area within which a man can act unobstructed by others…[or] not being interfered with by others.‖59 
Hannah Arendt describes the Bill of Rights specifically, and the U.S. Constitution generally, as a prime 
example of negative liberty. Even the right of representation and suffrage, ―claim not a share in government 
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but a safeguard against government.‖60 It consists of all the things I may do, or perhaps more correctly, all 
the things someone else cannot keep me from doing. Mirroring Mill‘s understanding, Berlin‘s negative 
freedom is about possibilities; it ―entails not simply the absence of frustration (which may be obtained by 
killing desires), but the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities — absence of obstructions on 
roads along which a man can decide to walk.‖61 The idea of variety, the presence of real choices or options, 
but not necessarily the exercise of these options is crucial to negative liberty. It is both the greatest amount 
of autonomy combined with the widest array of choices. 
As one might imagine, Mill is often taken to be the quintessential advocate of negative liberty. On 
Liberty, after all, is about the ―limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the 
individual.‖62 Likewise in The Subjugation of Women, Mill writes how ―the love of power and the love of 
liberty are in eternal antagonism.‖63 Other thinkers, from Hobbes and Tocqueville to Milton Friedman, also 
defend negative liberty as the desirable form.64 Benjamin Constant‘s exposition of the difference between 
ancient and modern liberties, likewise, was as much a glorification of the modern‘s more enlightened views 
on (negative) liberty as it was a call for a better inclusion of the ancient variety.65 
As Berlin points out, negative liberty says almost about who rules the state, i.e. whether it is 
independent or democratic, how political power is created or affected, or even what people do with their 
freedom once they have it. Liberal institutions and democratic governments appear to be the most 
conducive to preserving negative liberties, but the ideas are clearly distinct.66  
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It is this notion of governance that rests at the heart of positive freedom. It speaks to notions about 
what and who should be free. The positive liberty, according to Berlin, ―derives from the wish on the part 
of the individual to be his own master,‖ not simply to have none.67 It is the ―freedom to be the most one can 
be. Attaining this goal—often a group effort—entails both the discovery of one‘s higher self and the 
extension of its master over one‘s lower (deluded) self.‖68 Like the ancient Greek conception of freedom 
and the sovereignty of the polis, positive freedom involves sovereignty and self-government of the 
individual, not just the absence of a foreign rule.   
In some applications, positive freedom is distinctly personal and apolitical. The Stoics, for 
instance, advocate a form of positive freedom in encouraging self-control ―by either adapting to the world 
or making oneself as independent of it.‖69 In their philosophy, as epitomized by Epictetus‘s The Handbook, 
there is a sense that the world is what it is, independent of human desires, and man must adapt to it.70 For 
the Stoics, positive freedom becomes about changing the person, molding him and his preferences to match 
what the world can offer. Freedom is achieved not by opening the realm of choices, but by shaping the 
person to make the available options desirable. Since the subject no longer wants something beyond the 
attainable, because he chooses what is available, he is free.  This is often likened to the type of ―character 
planning‖ of the Stoics and Buddhists, who endeavor to cultivate a spiritual harmony within the person by 
controlling the tempest of internal thoughts and desires.71  
 Thoreau also presents a very peculiar class of positive freedom, a freedom as self-direction which 
is both distinctly positive in conception, Marxist in foundation and bordering on anarchist. For Thoreau, as 
Brian Walker describes, ―to be free means to have time for one‘s proper pursuits; time to figure out what 
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one wants to do and then go out and do it.‖72 Finding the true self, the mark of positive liberty, takes time, 
reflection and introspection.  
Ruth Lane goes further to suggest Thoreau is advocating an individual self-government where 
freedom is defined in the double entendre to ―mind our own business.‖73 In the first sense, like Walker‘s 
suggestion, we must be mindful of what we are doing, and what we truly want to do, in order to be free. He 
instructed individuals to discover and doggedly pursue the activities, desires and wants of the intrinsic 
self.74 But also, Lane‘s construction indicates the best route to freedom is away from people, distractions 
and interdependence with others.75  
The problem as Thoreau saw it is people too often celebrated the legal liberation from restraints 
without recognizing the social constraints, particularly in the form of obligation and necessity. In ―Slavery 
in Massachusetts,‖ Thoreau writes how ―Now-a-days, men wear a fool‘s cap, and call it a liberty 
cap…there are some, who, if they were tied to a whipping-post, and could get but one hand free, would use 
it to ring the bells and fire the cannons, to celebrate their liberty.‖76 For Thoreau, excessive attachments to 
the social institutions, the obligations of work and wealth, constrained the liberty of individuals to be the 
masters of their own lives.  
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Thoreau was not alone in this belief. Max Pohlenz describes how the Greeks say both debt and 
trade as sources of unfreedom, because they create a dependence on forces outside the city-state.77 
According to Stephen Ellenburg, Rousseau also railed against ―those social arrangements which also render 
men dependent upon the particular wills of one another… economic specialization, an economic division of 
labor…commerce, economic competition, and the use of money as a medium of exchange and for 
collecting taxes.‖78 Society and the demands of social living bred a dependency and obligation that was the 
antithesis of freedom. It encouraged debt and trade and the division of labor, all of which undermined the 
ability of a man to be his own person and accountable only to himself. Not surprisingly, Ralph Waldon 
Emerson also shared the same perspective and was equally quick to indict society for the tendency to 
exacerbate mutual dependence. In his ―Self-Reliance,‖ Emerson writes, ―society everywhere is in 
conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members…Society is a joint-stock company, in which 
the members agree, for the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and 
culture of the eater. The virtue in most respects is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion…Whoso would 
be a man must be a nonconformist.‖79 All dependence is a source of unfreedom because it diminishes the 
power of individual autonomy. 
All these theories seem to solve Mill‘s problem of social power by simply disbanding or 
dramatically recasting ‗the social.‘ Thoreau‘s slightly less radical solution was to keep one‘s estate as small 
as possible, so as to keep the necessity for work and other drudgeries as light as possible. As he explains in 
―Life without Principle,‖ this enables him to both enjoy the work he does and to keep it at the bare 
minimum levels, maximizing his time for principled deliberation. He writes,  
Perhaps I am more than usually jealous with respect to my freedom. I 
feel that my connection with and obligation to society are still very 
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slight and transient. Those slight labors which afford me a livelihood, 
and by which it is allowed that I am to some extent serviceable to my 
contemporaries, are as yet commonly a pleasure to me, and I am not 
often reminded that they are a necessity. So far I am successful. But I 
foresee, that, if my wants should be much increased, the labor required 
to supply them would become a drudgery.80 
 
Adopting a simple life, not only frees one from burdensome work, but as Thoreau suggests makes 
work less of a burden. At this level, Thoreau‘s work is a discussion on discovering the freedom as self-
direction in a world that necessitates work, labor and struggle.81 As Walker points out, Thoreau is special 
among the philosophers of freedom because he did not enjoy particular wealth or economic security. 
Instead, or perhaps because, he advocated a simplification of life, a rejection of as much ―stuff‖ of the 
world as one could muster. Like the Greeks before the gods generally and Stoics specifically, Thoreau 
advocates changing the scope and desires of the self to meet the world‘s limitations. By rejecting as many 
worldly goods as possible, a man could reduce the requirements upon him and devote more exclusive 
attention to the pursuits he truly enjoyed. In other words, he could avoid obligation and requirement, which 
are imposed from outside and negate freedom, in exchange for greater self-direction, whereby an authentic 
self-determined pursuits.  
Since Berlin‘s first lecture on the division between positive and negative freedom, positive 
freedom in the sense of self-discovery has undergone a bit of revision. As Berlin describes in the first 
version of positive liberty, the individual searches for his more perfect self, which is achieved by enslaving 
the ―empirical bundle of desires and passions‖ making up the natural self.82 These varieties of positive 
theories are about the taming of human passion and vice and extend an old dichotomy between the mind 
and body envisioned by Aristotle. In the first book of Politics, Aristotle argues ―the distance between 
master and slave is likened to that between soul and body, and man and beast.‖83 Those with capacities 
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limited to the simply physical are by definition forces of slavery, while human rationality, the quintessential 
human trait, is true mastery.  
The original positive freedom entailed releasing the true human from the tyranny of his passions 
and bodily needs. A number of critics, led by Gerald C. MacCallum, have fairly successfully pointed out 
this is just negative liberty by another name. Positive freedom that sought to free the mind from the 
constraints of the body is little more than the pursuit of freedom from internal restrictions.84 Under this 
reading, all the typical champions of positive liberty, from the Stoics to Plato and Kant, ―turn out on 
close inspection to disagree with Hobbes and Constant, not about the meaning of liberty but about what 
counts as a constraint.‖85 Quentin Skinner, likewise, suggests Berlin‘s observation relies heavily on the 
observation that ―the obstacles to your capacity to act freely may be internal rather than external, and 
that you will need to free yourself from these psychological constraints if you are to act 
autonomously.‖86 Positive and negative freedoms appear to be more about two sites of freedom rather 
than two different conceptions.  
Responding to this view, defenders of positive liberty recast it as self-realization. Like Thoreau, 
this type of positive liberty emphasizes the process of discovering the authentic self. At that discovery, 
one may change the nature of the internal constraints to achieve higher and higher levels of transcendent 
perfection. Skinner, for his parts, adopts this narrower understanding of positive liberty. ―Freedom,‖ he 
writes, ―is thus equated not with self-mastery but rather with self-realization, and above all with self-
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perfection, with the idea (as Berlin expresses it) of myself at its best.‖ 87 Likewise, Gary Reed discusses, 
―self-mastery is self-realization, making actual a self that is latent or potential only, but represented by 
an ideal which is imagined as the ruling part, the part of oneself that inspires one‘s proper actions.‖ 88 The 
emphasis is no longer internal constraints as such, but once again, the goal just beyond them, an  end state 
that has moral and ethical, even spiritual content. According to Eric Nelson, this view puts neo -
Hegelians T.H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet in position as the chief defenders of positive liberty.  
FORCED TO BE FREE 
The problem for many is less about the specific form of positive liberty. Instead, when the pursuit 
of self perfection leaves the asocial tendencies of Thoreau and takes on a distinctly political flavor, it seems 
to operate as a tyranny. In political positive liberty, the individual seeking perfection looks outward for 
status, confirmation and enforcement. Pursing the process of the perfect self, the individual often seeks to 
lose himself to the ―social ‗whole‘ of which the individual is an element or aspect: a tribe, a race, a Church, 
a State, the great society of the living and the dead and the yet unborn.‖89 The group or social whole crafts 
an understanding of the perfect man, a philosophical ideal of perfection. The social whole then enforces the 
observance of those laws on individuals in order to affect their emancipation to ‗true freedom.‘90 Coercion, 
then, the social and legal restrictions, becomes a means to attain and maintain liberation of the self; to be 
―shamed, penalized or even physically harmed—by other members of the group in an effort to rid one of 
that [impure] obstacle to the liberty of self-mastery is then to be helped to be free.‖91 The law, then, 
becomes not only a means of preserving peace, but of pursuing freedom, not just for one, but for all.  
 The adherents of positive freedom usually emphasize the degree to which law and order are 
necessary for the discovery of true freedom. Goethe, for example, in his 1802 poem ―Nature and Art,‖ 
remarks, ―Only in self-restriction does the master reveal himself/And only law can give us liberty.‖92 As 
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mentioned above, Mathew Arnold likewise makes an appeal to authority as something that brings greater 
levels of freedom. Contending that culture brings us to light, which in turn ―shows us that there is nothing 
so very blessed in merely doing as one likes…that the really blessed thing is to like what right reason 
ordains, and to follow her authority.‖93 John Christman contends the defense of positive freedom comes 
from an understanding that the ability to act is devoid of any discussion on what, where, how and why acts 
should occur. The question of freedom becomes, then, a concern ―of the quality of agency and not merely 
the opportunity to act.‖94 Without that discussion, without an understanding of a higher order positive 
freedom, citizens lose ―the conditions of authentic self-government that make freedom meaningful as an 
ideal.‖95 In a pure negative conception, the gain the means to be free by lose the method. 
Christman characterizes the fear of positive liberty as concern over ―a treacherous tilt toward the 
justification of centralized power under the guise of moral superiority.‖96 Berlin, in particular, is often read 
as maintaining insurmountable doubts about whether positive freedom can be anything but tyrannical. He 
seems to suggest this ―tilt‖ appeals to some innate predisposition or desire of the human psyche. Despite all 
the wranglings on individual freedom, we still ― recognize that it is possible, and at times justifiable, to 
coerce men in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or public health) which they would, if they were 
more enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not, because they are blind or ignorant or corrupt.‖97 Because 
of mutual sympathy, compassion, even an entirely laudable desire to nurture and care for one‘s fellow man, 
a desire born in rough prehistoric tribes where society and mutual aide not only separated man from the rest 
of the animal kingdom but was essential for survival, an imperative to help that is now coded in our DNA, 
because of all these things, the temptation to help others by coercing them to an action is just too great. It 
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becomes so ―easy for me to conceive of myself as coercing others for their own sake, in their, not my, 
interest.‖98 So, the best intentions ultimately affect a tyranny.  
But then, it would seem, we have come full circle. Mill guided us away from the positive freedom of 
Victorian England. He asserted we each must be able to determine for ourselves the best mode of life. It was 
not for society to determine a morality and set it upon us. Yet even Mill had no concern for positive liberty. In 
A System of Logic, he argues having ―power over our own character‖ is an essential part of freedom.99 We can 
also see them in On Liberty in his sideways acceptance of paternalism, so long as the objective is the 
cultivation of individuality.100 His desire, it would appear, is a perfect harmony, a pacification of the human 
tumult. As he points out in On Liberty, those potentially objectionable ―desires and impulses are as much a 
part of a perfect human being as beliefs and restraints: and strong impulses are only perilous when not 
properly balanced.‖101 Even for Mill, balanced control and harmony are central motivations.  
Even looking back to Arnold, there seems to be a sense, despite his emphasis against do as one 
likes, that he too desires a more complete union between doing and doing rightly. His understanding of 
Hebraism and Hellenism, after all, parallels the distinction between positive and negative liberty.102 Mills 
negative liberty is more akin to Hellenism. It is about agility and escape, fluidity and dynamics. As Arnold 
writes, ―Hellenism attacks ignorance, ugliness, and rigidity of mind.‖103 By contrast, ―Hebraism…fixes 
above all on the idea of duty, of moral rules, of the subjugation of the self: its chief concern is to act 
rightly.‖104 Nearly the same concept recognized in Berlin‘s positive liberty. 
These two elements, Hellenism and Hebraism, quickly capture the trends found in this chapter: the 
tension between freedom as individual autonomy, self-government and self-realization and the social 
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constraints found within both Mill and positive theorists. Even for a liberal like Mill, there is a dual, 
competing desire, between the chaos of dynamism and autonomy and the regulating control of social 
institutions and norms. It is to the explication of this tension, to the examination of freedom as control, that 




PARTT TWO: FREEDOM AND CONTROL 
Chapter III 
Freedom & Liberty 
Freedom and liberty are not the same. True most people consciously treat them as twins. Hobbes 
persistently talk about ―liberty, or freedom.‖1 In his ―Two Concepts,‖ Berlin notes he considers the two as 
interchangeable; as does Quentin Skinner in Liberty before Liberalism. It is bad enough that in ordinary 
use, the two words operate as nearly complete synonyms despite some etymological nuances. In the precise 
semantic exercise of theory, the haphazard use of liberty and freedom is so cavalier, scholars seemingly 
feel the space is so minute or inconsequential its best dispensed with.  But it is a mistake to squander the 
happy accident of linguistics endowing English with the free choice.2 Considering some cultures do not 
even have a native word resembling either liberty or freedom, the lack of distinction is even more tragic. 
We squander our treasure. Use your liberty and freedom completely and correctly, a mother might 
admonish, there are unfree around the world who would love to have either. 
Only a handful of scholars seriously distinguish liberty and freedom. Hannah Arendt in On 
Revolution is certainly the heavy weight of the group.3 Hanna Pitkin furthers Arendt‘s own distinctions; and 
Bruce Baum follows a few others to suggest J.S. Mill has both an explicit principle of liberty within an 
implicit freedom.4 
For all these individuals, the key difference between liberty and freedom is a matter of power. 
Liberty is rightfully the absence or destruction of power over an agent. It is the process of liberation, 
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similar to a slave‘s manumission. Freedom is the more difficult constitution and exercise of power from 
within the free agent. It is possession and control. It is the full emancipation of man‘s energy and potential. 
Manumission is not the same as emancipation.  
Liberty is negative. It is the absence, the ―‗holding off‘ an intruder, trespasser, or despot.‖5 Rousseau 
grasped at a similar idea of la liberté, which ―does not consist as much in acting according to one‘s own will 
as in not being subjected to the will of anyone else.‖6 Iris Young, likewise, construed liberty as the escape 
―from domination...in the sense that…[no other] is in a position to coerce or threaten others into accepting 
certain proposals or outcomes.‖7 Mutually conditions of liberty are precisely what the Greeks sought with the 
emphasis on isonomy. It was the conditions of no-rule that gave men the opportunity to construct public 
spaces, equally, where they might perform their freedom of self-government. 
For the medieval lord, his liberty is the literal space, the territory, where he is outside the control 
of the sovereign. His freedom, is the exercise of his power to both hold off encroachment on that liberty 
and to effectively govern it. His freedom is, quite literally, his sovereignty.  
Perhaps the best metaphor for explaining liberty is the Roman patria potestas. As described in 
Chapter I, the patria potestas was the complete power of the father over those within his family: the slaves, 
his wife, his minor and adult children, even his children‘s children. This power was plenipotentiary and 
unjusticable. Even the manumitted slave was not completely free because he remained in his former 
master‘s power.8 It was an inescapable power. Every freedom or liberty one enjoyed was at the discretion, 
or liable to the veto, of the patria potestas.   
For an individual or a society to live under another‘s power is to be a slave. As Quentin Skinner 
describes, what he calls the Neo-Roman, or republican, writers were painfully aware of this.  Livy, among 
others, connects the idea of living in another‘s power (in potestate) as the antithesis of liberty. As Skinner 
describes, Livy used the common terminology to describe ―communities without liberty as living in potestate, 
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within the power or under the dominion of another nation or state.‖9 To live in another‘s power is to make a 
farce of your own. The Greeks, with their emphasis on independence from foreign domination, likewise 
understood this idea. So, did Arendt, in differentiating the liberation from the constitution of power.10  
To find liberty is to destroy or leave the power of another. It is to become, as in the ius 
personarum, sui iuris, in one‘s own jurisdiction, or more properly within the jurisdiction of the public 
law.11 Skinner explains that even when the slave is able to turn the tables on his master, as was common in 
Roman comedy, he was never truly free or in control, because he always remained under the power of his 
master, ―subject or liable to death or violence at any time.‖12 Skinner describes this condition by recalling 
the etymological origin of ‗obnoxious,‘ which in the Roman law context described someone ―perpetually 
subject or liable to harm or punishment.‖13 To be obnoxious is to be, as Thoreau would have said, 
dependent on the unbalanced relations of control with another, within another‘s power.  
Liberty is essentially not being obnoxious. It is about escaping the potestas of a higher authority. 
The process of destroying or leaving the power of another, liberation, is only one step in the process of 
freedom. We have liberty, but no real libertas, as Livy described the ability ―to stand upright by means of 
one‘s own strength without depending on the will of anyone else.‖14 We in liberty are not dependent on a 
higher will, but do we have any strength? Liberty, in this sense, denotes none of the pervasive self-
possession found in the concept of freedom. Arendt forcefully explains, ―It may be a truism…that 
liberation and freedom are not the same; that liberation may be the condition of freedom but by no means 
leads automatically to it; that the notion of liberty implied in liberation can only be negative, and hence, 
that even the intention of liberating is not identical with the desire for freedom.‖15 She remarks the 
coincidence of the two is so temporally proximate it is easy to lose the distinction, but that it is there 
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nevertheless.16 Liberation is the destruction of potestas, the power of one agent over another. Freedom, 
however, is more than just the absence of potestas; it is the creation and exercise of an internal self-power. 
ANOMIA AND AUTONOMIA 
Liberation can just as easily lead to conditions of anomia as autonomia.17 Familiar enough, the 
root of both anomia and autonomia refers to the Greek nomos, which conveys conditions of ―rule, 
governance, or law.‖18 The a- prefix in anomia conveys a negation or absence, so anomia is the absence of 
every kind of rule; auto-, naturally enough, refers to the self, so that autonomia, associated with autonomy, 
quite literally means ―the state of being self-governed or self-sovereign.‖19 In both conditions, there is no 
power over the actor, no dominus potestas, we might say.  
This is important because when an external figure controls or commands, we cannot rightly speak 
of any kind of liberty or freedom. In Two Tracts on Civil Liberty, Richard Price sums up this sentiment, 
saying a country ―subject to the legislature of another country in which it has no voice, and over which it 
has no control, cannot be said to be governed by its own will. Such a country, therefore, is in a state of 
slavery.‖20 The same is true for the slave subject to his master‘s power. But once liberated, we do not 
necessarily know anything about the new state of affairs, whether the condition is anomia or autonomia.  
Anomia is the absence of government. It is, in some senses, the unconstrained, unregulated liberty 
conservative-inclined thinkers fear, Arnold‘s absolute abandon of ―doing as one likes.‖21 Like the failed 
state, conditions of anomia are absolutely anarchical.  There is no order, no command. There is no 
authority, no government either locally or internationally. A failed state is in conditions of anomia. It is 
proper to say that it is a free state, because no higher authority or colonial power rules over it, but neither 
does it rule itself. It is in conditions of pure anarchy.  
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 Autonomia is sovereignty, both the independence from potestas and the exercise of internal 
power. Ancient cities and empires were autonomous ―when they made their own laws and controlled their 
own affairs, as opposed to being controlled by some other city or empire.‖22 When we are both liberated 
and possess autonomia, we are free.  
LIBERTY AGAINST POWER 
Liberation can lead either to anomia or autonomia. Another way of putting this is liberty and power 
are antithetically opposed, but not opposites. To have no liberty is literally to be possessed by another. To be 
free is to be possessed by yourself.  But the first condition by no means necessitates the other.  
The history of Western civilization is principally the history of liberty, not freedom. The great 
political struggles have been about busting concentrations of power as a means of dispersing the potestas 
above.23 In the process of that struggle, power has become the demon; it has become the object of scorn and 
derision. We have become inclined to hate all power, to see it as the opposite of freedom, even when 
nothing could be further from the truth. Working the anti-power fetish, we have destroyed the very means 
by which we might gain control and become free.  
The problem is the anti-power struggle is deeply engrained in our history. As mentioned at the 
onset of the first chapter, it was a conflict of power between the Greeks and invading Persians which 
probably set off exploration of the freedom idea in the first place.24 The imminent threat of a foreign power 
catalyzed the idea of freedom. The landed barons of the Middle Ages sought their liberties from the power 
of the higher kings. The women‘s liberation movement, in many ways, was about the destruction of the last 
vestiges of social patria potestas, which followed a far older, similar struggle between fathers and sons. 
The United States was also born in the struggle against the foreign power. An awareness and struggle 
that by the 19th century it had become a paranoia. ―Good republicans feared, ‗power,‘ liberty‘s tyrannical 
opposite,‖ Harry Watson explains, because ―power was the threat of control by others. Power was a terrible 
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attribute of governments and private authorities that constantly sought to restrict what it did not control.‖25 
Like the ancients, the presence of both master‘s and slaves only made the concept and appeal of freedom 
sharper. Unfortunately, however, these initial struggles underestimated the difficulty of establishing freedom 
as something beyond merely the absence of external potestas or dominus. These liberty-fighters, largely 
unacquainted with the actualities of undominated life, thought freedom was automatic in the absence of 
external control. They understood the struggle of liberty, but not the fight for freedom. 
Americans of this period could feel the blessings of liberty and pull of freedom because they were 
just beginning to feel the absence of restraint on the one hand, and the promise of personal power on the 
other. Again Harry Watson argues, ―At a practical level, such a man could identify liberty as the 
independence he enjoyed as the owner of a farm or ship. Power, by contrast, was the total authority that a 
master could exercise over his dependents, whether they were slaves, servants, women, or children.‖26 The 
destruction of central power in the 19th century provided a wealth of both liberty and freedom for the lucky 
few at the top of the social hierarchy.  
Certainly, the process of liberation had to come first for a greater freedom to ascend. Freedom as 
self-possession and sovereignty is inconceivable in a world marked by domination. They had yet to learn 
the lesson, as many continue to miss, that even though ―coercion is usually counted among the most 
important obstacles to freedom [and even though] liberty has even been defined as the absence of coercion‖ 
does not mean that freedom itself is merely the ―absence of coercion.‖27 Describing the relation between 
liberty and power in Jacksonian America, Harry Watson speaks about both the tendency for early-
American republicans to resist power as antithetical to liberty, while at the same time describing how the 
great democratic reforms of the early 19th century consciously operated to expand the level of popular 
control. As is typical, he unconsciously separates the terms freedom, power and control, without 
questioning how they might be related, let alone synonymous.28 
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As the vanguards of liberty gained greater and greater levels of success, deconstructing ever larger 
sources of potestas, many chafed at continued frustrations to the realization of their freedom. They saw 
concentrations of power falling by the way side, but still did not feel the control and power they sensed 
freedom promised. Surely, the problem must be continued, hidden sources of potestas continuing to 
practice upon them. They succumbed to a ravenous inquisition against all possible sources of dominus. 
With each new step, surely the realization of freedom was just around the corner.  
Eventually, they realized power was not the only source of potestas. Force, law, authority – they all 
act to give the possessor control over others. The first struggles were against specific powers, but later 
extended to sources of authority as well. Authority, the influence without power, was a particularly promising 
target.29 Authority is the exercise of a priori right and commands assent not because it is power or because it 
is reasonable, but because it is.30 Authority, like power, still places men into hierarchical relations and so just 
another form of potestas. And it is the hierarchy itself which denotes potestas and limits liberty. 
The liberty theocracy evolves into an orthodox zealotry against power and authority of every kind. 
The result, described by Gertrude Himmelfarb is ―the debasement of the idea of authority…[which] is reduced 
to nothing more than the exercise of power or force.‖31 Any number of commentators on liberty political left 
and right fret over liberty‘s tendency to ―become hyperexteneded into a kind of libertarian liberalism that sees 
power, and nothing but power, everywhere, and that casts the same acids of suspicion and mistrust on the 
family and civil associations that political liberals have traditionally reserved for the government.‖32 In an 
extreme, this tendency is seen in the philosophy of those like Thoreau, whose love of nature is rooted in ―his 
recognition that in the woods and the fields there is no authority structure to set one man over another.‖33 Plato 
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recognized how citizens of the democracy, infatuated with their isonomy, ―become so sensitive that they 
resent the slightest application of control as intolerable tyranny, and in their resolve to have no master they 
end by disregarding even the law, written or unwritten.‖34 Liberty‘s begins sights on the power above is 
clearly not enough because sheer liberty cannot guarantee the freedom of control. So, the search for freedom 
expands into the destruction of authority and every other force acting as an external potestas.   
So where liberty and liberalism operate to reduce individual power and authority of and over 
individuals, freedom demands individuals retain functional power. The command of freedom is to control, 
but liberalism‘s emphasis on liberty excoriates sources of power, authority and distinction that make 
meaningful, palpable control ineffective. Within the rabid excesses of liberty, one finds the dissolution of 
the very mechanisms which make freedom possible and real.  
POWER AND CONTROL 
The threat of power is the threat of control.  But, it is important to differentiate between power. 
Power is potential; control is application. The distinction is common in international relations literature, 
where power is often operationalized as ―control over outcomes.‖ As Robert Keohane and Josephy Nye 
write in the classic, Power and Interdependence, ―we can look at the initial power resources that give an 
actor a potential ability; or we can look at that actor‘s actual influence [that is control] over patterns of 
outcomes.‖35 For the more ethereal discussions of liberty and freedom, the difference is more important. It 
is not necessary that someone practice control, or any kind of dominus, over you for your liberty to be 
incomplete. You merely need to be under the potential of control or dominus, the potestas over you.  
The benevolent master‘s slave remains a slave because both external power and external control 
pose real limits. It is easy enough to understand how outside control is a threat. When one i s controlled 
he is compelled to act, forced physically. The threat of power is a bit deeper. We see this in the 
particularly insidious unfreedom of self-censorship. When one is dependent on another, it is far more 
difficult to practice the full expression of the self, for fear of reprisal, the exploitation of the power of 
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dependency.  To avoid this control, as Mill noted among those of weak constitution, people engage in a 
self-restraint called self-censorship.  
Failing to understand freedom as one‘s own self-power can lead an individual to miss the artificial 
character of his supposed freedom. Hobbes, for instance, was convinced freedom amounted to little but 
doing. In particular, Hobbesian freedom was nothing but the practice of doing, and like the ancient Greek 
and Roman conceptions, was principally the ability to act within the law‘s silent space and limited only by 
the restrictions of one‘s faculties. This method of understanding freedom led Hobbes to suggest both the 
citizens of the republic of Lucca and the subjects of the sultan of Constantinople shared comparable levels 
of freedom. Both, he said, acted within comparably large domains of space, that is, the law was sufficiently 
silent in both communities to permit an extended range of action.36 
The problem is this construction denies the source of control of the freedom. Inhabitants of both 
Lucca and the Ottoman Empire might enjoy the same liberty, the people of Lucca, because they govern 
themselves and exercise control over the law are certainly more free. The object of the Ottoman sultan, 
however, does not exercise anything like control over the law, and are subject not only to changes in their 
liberty in the future, but to changes which are unannounced or ex post facto. The difference is in the 
reliance on the person of the sultan for your liberty, while maintaining no control, no security, yourself.  
As Harrington responds to Hobbes, ―even the greatest bashaw in Constantinople is merely a tenant 
of his head, liable to lose it as soon as he speaks or acts in such a way to cause the sultan offense. The very 
fact, in other words, that the law and the will of the sultan are one‖ limits one‘s freedom.37 The critique 
parallels Thoreau‘s own understanding of freedom as self-sufficiency. Both arguments assert that freedom 
is something internal, that it cannot depend on others and it cannot be at the whim of others.  
The challenge for a number of prominent theorists has been the method of resolving this conflict. 
How may men be free in society and yet dependable on no one for his freedom? The solution a great many, 
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such as Harrington and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, has been a form of republican democracy. Since one‘s 
freedom cannot exist based on the will of a king, despot or tyrant, only the people, the freemen in 
corporate, can make a truly free law. Otherwise, they depend on the will of the tyrant for their rights. They 
have no liberty or freedom. The neo-Romans argued that it ―it is only possible to be free in a free state,‖ 
because otherwise one was always under another‘s power and also dependent on the good will of that 
power for one‘s freedom.38 In essence, the argument goes, a people can only be free in a society marked by 
the absence of a single potestas.  
Skinner describes a style of thought which demands people be the maker of their own social order. It 
is not enough to have liberties, one must also possess the social power. ―As [Marchamont] Medham affirms,‖ 
Skinner describes, ―if the people are to have ‗any real liberty,‘ they must be ‗possessed of the power‘ of 
‗enacting and repealing laws‘ and ‗duly qualified with the supreme authority.‖39 Skinner continues, ―Milton 
agrees that, if we are to count as a free people, we must submit only to ‗such Laws as our selves shall 
choose.‘‖40 The neo-Romans stressed the fact that one need not actually experience the control of another, feel 
the pressure of coercion, to find oneself in a state of unfreedom. Merely falling ―into a condition of political 
subjection or dependence, there by leaving yourself open to the danger of being forcibly or coercively 
deprived‖ of your freedom.41 Their target was principally the energy and power of the state, which they 
enthusiastically sought to constrain under principles of the rule of law, legal codification, and due process. 
Their argument was that to live in a society without these ironclad protections was already to live in an unfree 
state. As Quentin Skinner explains, ―your rulers may choose not to exercise these powers, or may exercise 
them only with the tenderest regard for you individual liberties. So you may in practice continue to enjoy the 
full range of your civil rights. The very fact, however, that your rulers possess such arbitrary powers means 
that the continued enjoyment of your civil liberty remains at all times dependent of their goodwill.‖42 You, in 
essence, have sacrificed true self-government by existing under the potential jurisdiction of an arbitrary will.  
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 The focus these neo-Romans are given to again involves the centrality of power to actual freedom. 
In their emphasis on the arbitrary dominus potestas, they risk simply replacing it with a civitatis potestas. 
The power of the community, which as we saw with the Greeks, is just as capable of curbing liberty and 
freedom as a despotic will. They risk crushing individual liberty and freedom under the crushing weight of 
a concentrated social regulation. When the people meet in corporate, their effective control, is no less 
concentrated or arbitrary, than the autocratic command.   
 The founders of the American republic were sympathetic to this line of reasoning. As Madison 
describes in The Federalist Papers, it is vital ―not only to guard the society against the oppression of its 
rules; but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part …from interested 
combinations of the majority.‘‖43 Arendt explains the solution realized by Montesquieu and the American 
founders, particularly Madison, was to create power aligned against itself to frustrate and confuse the 
application of social control.44 Each branch of government has the potential to control, the authority and the 
power, but are frustrated in the application. There becomes no method for the fruition of the will. The 
American system is blessed with an embarrassment of power, and cursed by a dearth of control.  
 This frustration of social control, in order to preserve mass liberty, is itself a limitation to freedom. In 
creating a system dominated by an inability to control, the American Founders created a system that preserved 
liberty but denied people the ability to exercise freedom. There are many things a person might do, control 
that could be exercised, but simply cannot be. Anyone who has ever been frustrated by the cumbersome 
granite that is American government can attest. The American system of government is not free, it is liberal.  
Freedom is both a matter of wanting, ability, and transforming into reality. Anyone who has ever 
encountered an obstacle understands the want. It is the desire beyond what is immediately attainable. It is the 
need for some development or change to reality. Once encountered by a need, one encounters the question of 
whether he has the ability to meet the need. As explained before, man‘s capacity to meet needs has expanded 
tremendously over the centuries, to the point now that almost anything is realizable. In doing so, however, we 
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have expanded the domain of what properly counts as an unfreedom. There are things we want, things which 
we have the ability to obtain, but which we are prohibited from obtaining by an inability of control.    
In government, we encounter this lack of control in a system with power, with means, but 
insufficient control. In other words, it is not just the ability to be at liberty from the control of others but the 
power, our self, to control that creates freedom. And, it is exactly this freedom which is denied to us. In 
Arendt‘s words, ―the political realm must be construed and constituted in a way in which power and 
freedom would be combined…and when we read in the earliest documents of colonial times that ‗deputies 
thus chosen shall have power and liberty to appoint‘ we can still hear how natural it was for these people 
[the Founders] to use the two words almost as synonyms.‖45 Berlin‘s positive freedom, which is very 
clearly about control, strikes at this meaning. As Mill demonstrates, ―It is of course necessary, to render our 
consciousness of freedom complete, that we should succeed in making our character all we have hitherto 
attempted to make it; for if we have wished and not attained, we have, to that extent not the power over our 
own character, we are not free.‖46 It is the union of the wish, the means, and the effective power to the 
means, the control, that makes up both political and personal freedom.  
RESOURCES OF FREEDOM 
The means of control necessitate other elements that are often then mistaken for freedom itself. 
Especially in a social context, where interaction and interference are always liable to curb one‘s liberty and 
freedom, maintaining an individual source of power is crucial.47 Ultimately, the individual‘s liberty and 
freedom rest on ―his ability to resist encroachment and enforce his commands.‖48 In that context, the 
struggle, and liberties, of the landed gentry makes so much more sense. Their independence, their rights 
and privileges, were tied to the land because that was the source of wealth and power, resources which 
enabled both their liberty and freedom. With the expansion of commerce, and wider avenues to the pursuit 
of wealth and power, the idea of liberty, and the free power to support it, became something more and more 
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could reach at, unconstrained by the sparse supply of real estate.49 Similarly, the Greeks‘ claim to freedom 
did not contradict the idea of holding slaves or power over others, instead one idea appeared to 
―complement the other, as exercising power over others confirmed and enhanced one‘s own freedom.‖50 
Wealth is both a sign and source of freedom. The possession of resources expands one‘s freedom because it 
enables and the reach of one‘s power.  
The free market, as Milton Friedman understood it, operates as power-destructing (read liberty-
enhancing) and power-generating (read freedom-creating) enterprise. In Capitalism and Freedom, he 
writes, ―Economic arrangements play a dual role in a free society. On the one hand, freedom in economic 
arrangements is itself a component of freedom broadly understood, so economic freedom is an end in itself. 
In the second place, economic freedom is also an indispensible means toward the achievement of political 
freedom.‖51 His view in the first place is that economic independence, the liberty to pursue one‘s own 
economic life is the emancipation from an authority that tells you what to do. Friedman expands on both 
ideas in Free to Choose, where he remarks ―economic freedom is an essential requisite for political 
freedom…by dispersing power, the free market provides an offset to whatever concentration of political 
power may arise.‖52 The market destroys anti-liberty hierarchies.  
The second place, he refers to economic autonomy as a means toward an independent source of 
pecuniary power. This power is, then, the foundation of every claim to freedom, as the ability to resist 
encroachment and give form to will. The first process decentralizes power, that is creates liberty; the 
second provides a means for mass wealth, which supports individual claims to control, that is the free 
market is a means toward freedom.  
Certainly another vital part of this same process is choice. Someone who is in control has 
options to be exercised. It is a mistake, however, to make decision-making the object, the total content, 
of freedom. As Mortimer Adler understands, freedom is more than just the choice and the ability to carry 
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it out, but is realized, ―if, through both choice and action, he has the power to achieve a desired 
objective,‖ a man is practically free.53  
Choice is too commonly mistaken as the object of freedom. Liberals are particularly guilty of this 
sin. There remains an instinctual inclination to judge the ―liberty of a man or group….[as] determined by 
the range of choosable  possibilities…the more avenues men can enter, the broader those avenues, the more 
avenues that each opens into, the freer they are.‖54 Business ethicist Charles Horvath also points to 
Merriam-Webster‘s Dictionary entry for freedom, defining freedom as ―the absence of necessity, coercion, 
or constraint in choice or action.‖55 As Theodore Putterman puts it, ―to throw off restraints is to be free; to 
be free is to have choices, and to have choices is to be empowered.‖56 Certainly choice is important. To 
force a man into ―a life in which he exercises no choices…is sin against the truth that he is a man, a being 
with a life of his own to live.‖57 Isaiah Berlin hesitantly admits, saying ―the mere existence of alternatives is 
not….enough to make my action free.‖58 So although it seems natural to say someone with freedom will 
have choices, options and alternatives are not enough to make one free. It is power itself, and its means of 
expanding choice, that is the functional operation of freedom. 
Freedom then is ―the ‗power to make one‘s will effective,‘ as John R. Commons might have put 
it.‖59 ―Genuine freedom is not merely a negative absence of restraint, but also a position of power of 
participation.‖60 To have liberty is to be free from potestas; to have freedom is to have some kind of 
autonomia, a power from which choice derives.  
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World of Constraint 
There are various freedoms we are fond of: the freedoms of speech, religion, and of the press. To 
have the freedom to move or the freedom to speak are actions you may do freely, but simply doing them 
does not make you free. This realization leads one, as it does for David Hoekema, to the ―important 
differences between acting freely, being free to act, and being free.‖1 Understanding freedom requires 
understanding the gradations of free action.    
Acting freely is the lowest order, involving mere autonomy or independence of action. To act freely 
is to act, generally according to one‘s will, without the overly burdensome influence of outside forces. Acting 
freely, however, says nothing about whether those outside forces can potentially come to bear later. The slave 
to a beneficent master acts freely; he acts as if he were free. His master, however, retains power, or potential 
control, over him. Like the neo-Roman scholars teach us, even if that power is never exercised as control, it 
severely circumscribes the freedom of the agent. The freely acting slave is neither liberated, nor free.  
Hoekema refers to a Lockean thought experiment. During the night, a sleeping man is carried to a 
dungeon, sealed and locked in, the man awakes to find himself in the presence of a very dear friend who he 
very much wants to be with. What can we say about the man‘s friend, Locke asks, considering he does not 
want to be anywhere else but where he is, locked in a prison? As Hoekema describes, it seems clear that the 
man in Locke‘s example is staying in the room freely, since that is, after all, what he now wants to do, and 
he is doing so.‖2 The action is autonomous, the prisoner is not trying to get away or thwart his captors. The 
limits in which he exists are benign, but nevertheless present.  
This is to say freedom is never simple preference satisfaction, which we would be better to call 
happiness.3 The prisoner in the cell might be happy, he is after all getting everything he wants (as long as 
he does not want his freedom), but he is not free. 
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The friction between happiness and freedom is sadly underappreciated. George Fitzhugh, 
defending Southern slavery, remarks the peculiar institutions‘ slaves ―are the happiest and, in some sense, 
the freest people in the world. They enjoy [true] liberty, because they are oppressed neither by care nor 
labor.‖4 For Fitzhugh, freedom is not about escaping the restraint – after all, in Fitzhugh‘s words, ―the 
moral and physical world is but a series of subordinations.‖5 Instead, the search for freedom is about 
realizing ―corporeal and mental repose‖ that is the essential quality of freedom.6 Fitzhugh is the prime, 
albeit, extreme example of the conflation of freedom, happiness and tranquility. But like Rousseau 
contends, ―Life is tranquil in jail cells, too. Is that reason enough to like them? The Greeks lived tranquilly 
shut up in the Cyclop‘s cave as they awaited their turn to be devoured.‖7 Being happy or at peace is not the 
same as being free.  
Jon Elster has written a great deal about the interaction of preferences and freedom. His principle 
concern is in adaptive preference formation, whereby preferences change according to what appears 
achievable. As James Bohman describe, ―like the happy slave, those who can achieve little often desire 
little.‖8 So Fitzhugh‘s slave might very well be happy in his repose and tranquility because that singular 
moment of respite is all he can possibly wish for. To seek any more would be to subject oneself to the 
added oppression of despair.  
The practical problem with most adaptive, as opposed to autonomous, preference formation people 
tend to over-adapt, their new ―preferences tend to overshoot; that is, to adapt more than necessary, to make 
one want even less that is actually possible.‖9 These individuals, therefore, end up being even less free than 
originally because they constrain themselves more than necessary. ―The happy slave may not actually lack 
                                                            
4. George Fitzhugh, Cannibals All! Or, Slaves Without Masters (Charleston, S.C.: Fogotten Books, 2010), 
29.  
 
5. Ibid, 302. 
 
6. Ibid, 30. 
 
7. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, One the Social Contract, with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy, ed. 
Roger D. Master, trans. Judith Masters (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin‘s, 1978), 49.  
 
8. James Bohman, ―Deliberative Democracy and Effective Social Freedom,‖ in Deliberative Democracy: 
Essays on Reason and Politics, ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 327. 
 
9. Christian Rostbøll, ―Preferences and Paternalism on Freedom and Deliberative Democracy,‖ Political 




in achievements; that is, he may actually satisfy all of his given, but nonautonomous preferences.‖10 He is 
not free, however, because his power is not his own, he does not control the methods by which he is 
judged. Joshua Cohen adopts a similar construction, by concentrating on individual autonomy in 
deliberative society. He understands that freedom ends when ―the preference on which an agent acts are, 
roughly, given by the circumstances, and not determined by the agent.‖11  In both instances the man is not 
free because his preferences are directed, if not determined, specifically and directly by his external 
condition. His autonomy is the farce of freedom without control. 
As noted previously, a number of positive freedom theorists focus on the idea of character 
planning, of determining a virtuous self-rule that gives moral force to freedom. In bringing the passions to 
bear, the character planning of the Stoic, Buddhist and Spinozistic philosophies are distinguished from 
adaptive preference formation by the autonomous nature of their philosophy. One does not change one‘s 
preferences to suit one‘s surroundings, but to perfect one‘s self-rule.12 The trouble for negative freedom 
advocates like Berlin occurs when the autonomous nature of the preference formation is absent. Freedom is 
present in preference formation when it is an exercise of control, not surrender. Adaptive formation, 
because it responds to what is exterior and foreign, is an extension, a signal, of unfreedom rather than a 
method of escape.   
So acting freely, as it is associated with potentially non-autonomous happiness, is a weak 
indication of freedom. For the slave, it indicates a level of autonomy, but not autonomia.  
But not all restrictions of autonomy are unfreedoms. It makes perfect sense to think of instances in 
which a free individual might subject himself to restriction or obligation, without necessarily abridging his 
freedom.13 Indeed, we should not dismiss the way self-restriction both admits greater levels of freedom 
while reducing autonomy, as a means of heightening our positive freedom. The very meaning of personal 
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power and freedom is the ability to place restrictions on one‘s actions. The power to choose is taking 
possibilities and options and eliminating them down to a single one.  
Cohen‘s defense of deliberative democratic preference formation ultimately has to do with the 
degree the agent wants to mold and transform his preferences in response to reasoned argument. In essence, 
although admitting external, adaptive preference formation is an unfreedom, he is able to defend deliberate 
reformation by arguing what it means for preferences to be given by circumstances versus determined by an 
agent. To Cohen, the agent retains a kind of autonomia, a self-government by communal deliberative process. 
Robert Wolff also suggests autonomy does not require complete independence or autarky. The 
requirement of autonomy for Wolff is submission on conditions of the internal characteristics of the subject. 
An autonomous man, Wolff says, ―may do what another tells him, but not because he has been told to do 
it…By accepting as final the commands of the others, he forfeits his autonomy.‖14 Rousseau maintained a 
similar construction, it was the self-imposition of rules that were the defining element of his conception of 
freedom.15 The crucial difference again is the location of a power, who and why the submission occurs.  
One way to understand the difference is by reference to the power to leave. A restriction I submit 
to does not limit my freedom if I retain the first order autonomy to depart. No such ability resides with 
those in potestate because the slave has no autonomy to leave his master‘s control. The power (freedom) to 
leave is a critical power endemic to freedom, and in some sense is the distinguishing characteristic of what 
it means to be in one‘s own power, to have freedom. Even when to submitting for authority, an agent can 
remain free by retaining the right, the authority, the power to rescind the submission.16 Similarly, Walzer 
contends, ―liberalism is distinguished less by the freedom to form groups…than by the freedom to leave the 
groups and sometimes even the identities behind…What makes a marriage voluntary is the permanent 
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possibility of divorce.‖17 Certainly the power to leave is critical. It is a prime indicator of first-order control 
and is one of the first powers a potestas seeks to destroy when curbing liberty.  
The importance of the power to leave, though, is far from specific to liberalism. Socrates‘ speech 
on law in the Crito emphasizes the opportunities Socrates had to leave Athens long before his trial and 
sentence. His choice to stay was a submission to its laws.18 Rousseau also made much of the ―right of 
emigration,‖ which was only restricted in times of great emergency when the right to leave devolves into 
immoral abandonment.19 Walzer also includes an example from Jewish history. ―Members of the kahal, the 
autonomous or semiautonomous community of the Middle Ages,‖ he writes, ―were free to leave, to look for 
a community where they would be more comfortable with the local practices, but not until they had 
protested in public and tried to change the practices at home.‖20 The autonomy to leave is an indication of 
power, but it is not the complete power and control of freedom. Since we experience freedom as control, 
we are inclined to be dissatisfied with the option of leaving, but want the power to stay on our own terms.21  
The ability to act freely is not freedom or liberty, but nor is an inability to act freely necessarily 
slavery so long as the right to leave, or first-order autonomy, is truly intact and the restrictions are in some 
sense self-imposed.22 The first-order is the possession of a power that does not exist in conditions of 
slavery. The slave, after all, is always subject to the potential control of his master. His power is 
conditioned on the delegated dominus potestas over him. He has no power of his own.   
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IMPEDIMENTS TO FREE ACTION 
A man who is free to act has even more power than a man who merely acts freely. To refer back to 
Locke‘s thought experiment, the man who is free to act does not simply like what he is doing, but is free to 
do what he likes. Hoekema argues, the man in Locke‘s dungeon ―is free to stay, clearly: he is able to stay, 
and nothing prevents him from staying. But of course he is not free to leave, since the doors are locked.‖23 
That is to say, there is a power above him which prohibits his liberty, artificially constrains significant 
potential desires. The man is not free to act across the full range of potential, or even likely, alternatives. 
He has the range of possible avenues to want-satisfaction at his disposal; his is the power of 
potential action. As Theodore Putterman puts it, this is the instinctual inclination to judge the ―liberty of a 
man or group….[as] determined by the range of choosable  possibilities…the more avenues men can enter, 
the broader those avenues, the more avenues that each opens into, the freer they are.‖24 These open avenues 
are an indication no greater potestas exercises control or dominion over the agent to direct his action; the 
man with options is at liberty.  
Those who are free to act may still not be autonomous in the sense discussed above. They may 
have chosen to submit to some type of obligation or law, and so have a slightly smaller range of options 
than in autarky; but as liberated agents, they retain the ability to withdraw from that obligation. The 
freedom to act is a matter of degrees; the more options the agent can pursue, the freer he is. So, the prisoner 
may sit or stand, crawl or lay down, but is distinguished by the incredible range of things he may not do 
simply because someone else wills against it and physically restrains him from pursuing other actions. 
Because states of freedom are not conducive to dichotomy — one can be slightly freer or slightly 
less free with just marginal changes to situation — it is difficult to make bold declarations about how many 
choices are necessary to be free to act, versus merely acting freely. The determining factor usually hinges, 
instead, on the quality, not the quantity, of restriction.  
Perhaps the best way to deal with these many difficulties is to establish a hierarchy of unfreedom. 
Some unfreedoms count more than others, just like some freedoms are more essential than others. The 
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power to leave is more important than the liberty to drive a car, even though the two would be strongly 
related.25 The first casts out an entire range of our wants, the second only strikes at a method of 
convenience. Both diminish control, but one does so far more than the other. The car prohibition proscribes 
a tactic, not the desire or will realization. Likewise, the prohibition on a critical tactic constitutes the 
prohibition of the goal and exercise of will, it becomes a more complete unfreedom.  
Many also debate how to determine what true freedom limitations are. Isaiah Berlin, F.A. Hayek 
and Hoekema believe unfreedom must have a human source. Mere physical obstacles are not unfreedoms. 
To decide otherwise, they claim, is to make far too much of freedom, to make a straw-man of the concept. 
―For freedom is not the mere absence of frustration of whatever kind,‖ Berlin says, ―this would inflate the 
meaning of the word until it meant too much or too little.‖26 Hoekema cites the difference between freedom 
and ability. Not everything one is unable to do constitutes an unfreedom, particularly if the source of the 
inability is somehow statically determined. To construct freedom any other way is simply too broad; ―It has 
the consequence that human beings, or at any rate those who have a will to fly, are unfree to fly, and that 
persons who want to become good runners but lack the self-discipline necessary to achieve that condition 
are unfree to do so.‖27 Disregarding a class of impediments out of hand seems largely to be without cause. 
It seems the product of a general human fascination with the freedom fetish and a more basic unwillingness 
to accept limits. Instead, these thinkers would have us dismiss these limits as no real limits to our freedom 
at all, but beyond the domain of reasonable discussion. 
Others, like Gerald MacCallum are more generous. MacCallum understands freedom as ultimately 
a triple combination of the ―freedom of someone from something to do or become something‖ specific, 
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with the many debates on freedom principally concerning the various prepositional objects.28 In this 
construction, MacCallum himself ―appears willing to count any hindrance to action as a restriction on 
freedom.‖29 But since the important factor is not the quantity of impediments, but their quality, it is better 
to determine a rule for those unfreedoms which are tolerable (like an inability to fly away) and those that 
are not (the ability to get away).30 
It would seem the hindrances which may be immediately disbanded are the most obnoxious to our 
freedom. More specifically, we can understand the bounds of what can properly be thought of as a 
limitation to freedom as marked by what is within the plausible boundary of human control. Among the 
mutable differences, those that are, human in origin, and thus potentially within our control, amount to the 
worst tyrannies. ―To be free tout court is to be free from those hindrances to action which could be 
removed by others‘ actions.‖31 This is true, if for no other reason, because these things are more easily 
placed within our control. We can dominate others, and compel their action or action, more easily than we 
might control our internal chemistry or move a mountain.  
An implication to this construction, implied previously, is that what seemed as the natural-world-
givens to the ancient Greeks, the hard and fast, immutable boundaries that circumscribed individual freedom, 
seem like trival matters of convenience to the modern observer. As the knowledge of man has advanced, our 
expectations of what counts as freedom have likewise grown. Our capacity to control our world has grown by 
leaps and bounds, and so has the yardstick marking the distance to freedom. More and more quantities have 
been added to those things within our control, within the domain of things that constrain our freedom. 
So, there is a hierarchy of unfreedom. As Hoekema suggests, ―the hindrances that we count as 
obstacles to freedom…compose a subclass of the obstacles that are alterable by human action…and 
although a great many obstacles can be removed by human effort, it is the interference of other agents with 
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our action as we will that is of particular concern to us when we speak of freedom in general.‖32 The 
restrictions that count less are those imposed by nature; they are simply more difficult to control. These 
non-human objects can restrain an individuals‘ ability to act freely, and even prevent him from being free 
to act; but these non-human objects cannot properly keep a man from being free, since these objects, as 
non-purposive agents, cannot take control away from the agent. They can obstruct, inhibit and even 
occasionally compel, but they cannot control. Next, human-derived obstacles are the most noxious, because 
they are so easy to dispel, at least in theory.  
UNFREEDOM, RESTRAINT AND FORCE 
Of the human powers to make us unfree, restraint by force is the most critical. Hobbes, for 
example, would have us believe that any time my choice is executable I am free. For him, the distinction is 
not in the practice of coercion, the manipulation of ‗natural‘ costs or benefits, but only very physical 
impediments to the realization of the choices.  
Hobbes‘ purpose is to create an understanding of freedom compatible with (potentially) 
mercilessly governed action. Like the Greeks before him, Hobbes is given to understanding freedom as the 
quality of individual spontaneity in response to the world‘s influences, costs and benefits constructed by 
more powerful, external forces. Freedom, as he understands, is the ability, the absence of impediments, to 
respond to those costs and benefits as the individual mind and will determines. The result is that ―fear and 
liberty are consistent; as when a man throws his goods into the sea for fear the ship should sink, he does it 
nevertheless very willingly, and may refuse to do it if he will: It is therefore the action of one that was 
free.‖33 The fear of the potential costs of the storm, i.e. drowning when the ship sinks, induce the man to 
take an action he otherwise might not. Because there is not power over the man, in the sense of a will over 
the individual compelling the action, his liberty remain intact.  
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For Hobbes, the same is true of government regulation or the force of the sovereign. ―So a man 
sometimes pays his debt,‖ Hobbes says, ―only for fear of imprisonment, which because nobody hindered 
him from detaining, was the action of a man at liberty. And generally all action which men do in 
commonwealths, for fear of the law, [are] actions, which the doers had liberty to omit.‖34 Hobbes‘s 
emphasis is on the way the law re-forms and molds the will to the correct action. It is not an unfreedom, but 
a channeling of behavior.  
Even in this context you are free, Hobbes maintains, because your will is the basis of your action. 
By yourself you analyze options, costs and benefits, and finally determine a best course of action for 
yourself. Under Hobbes‘ understanding, ―it makes no sense to speak of being coerced into acting against 
your will, since the will lying behind your action will always be revealed by your action itself.‖35 The mind 
takes in stimulus from the environment, processes it according to the dictates of the individual‘s character, 
produces a determination that is then translated into action. Limitations to freedom and liberty occur, not in 
the processing of the various stimuli, or in some coercion, as modern observers generally do, but in 
impediments that break the link between the will‘s first-best option, based on the environmental stimuli, 
and what the individual has the ability, the means, to perform.36 Where someone prohibits, usually by force 
or physical presence, an action, only there is unfreedom.  
Coercion is just another incentive, not an unfreedom. If a man points a gun to my head, telling me 
to either hand over my wallet or else, Hobbes maintains I still act freely and am free to act. For Hobbes, 
―the person who acts under coercion acts as a result of his choice to submit rather than risk intolerable 
harm, and surely the making of a choice presupposes freedom. A person who is physically compelled is 
evidently deprived of his freedom, and yet coercion leaves the victim a decision whether or not to 
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submit.‖37 I still have choice to either turn over my money or be shot. We instinctively understand such a 
circumstance is unfree, a quintessentially coercive relation.38  
In Hobbes‘ understanding of freedom there is more than just the realization that Hobbes was a 
little power crazed. One must admit that to a great extent Hobbes was correct, but not about what it means 
to be free to act, but what it means to be free, to have power and control.  
Before the gunman approaches me, I am filled with liberty and freedom. I have no master, and 
perfect power and control over myself and my surroundings. The gunman transgresses on my freedom 
when it puts the gun to my head. He has attacked my autonomy, diminishing the range of choices on 
which I may act. He has also curtailed my right to leave, therefore diminishing an important source of 
my power, control and freedom.  
He has not yet destroyed either my freedom or liberty, but has curtailed them in important ways 
and promises to further if his demands are not met. As Hoekema states, the ―threatened penalty [by itself] 
leaves an agent no less free than he was without the threat.‖39 The highwayman‘s ultimate object is to place 
me under his power, but because I have power of my own, power which might overwhelm his, he stops 
before an outright assault and instead resorts to coercion, a projection of the threat of power. In this 
coercion, the gunman is merely tinkering with my potential payoffs.  
If I refuse to acquiesce, the gunman might try to compel me to hand over the money. That is, he will 
try to take it by force. The gunman, then, directly attacks my liberty by attempting to exercise control over me. 
His ultimate goal is to destroy my liberty in the absence of a higher power and my freedom in the presence of 
my own power. Until his formal assault, he has not truly taken either, simply threatened to.  
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THE REFUSAL TO SUBMIT 
If at any point, however, I submit to his demands, I choose to surrender both my liberty and my 
freedom. In this sense, the disposition of my freedom is determined by my own actions and my power, not 
his. If I submit to his will, I allow his power, his potential for control, to become real. He exercises control 
over me, and robs me of both the money in my wallet and the power in my freedom. I can hope he does 
nothing more; but I cannot deny that I have freely given away my freedom. This is how we can talk about 
men who die free rather than live as slaves. They refuse to submit, to surrender their own control. So 
instead, their liberty is destroyed, very often followed quickly by their life.   
In the refusal to submit, however, we can see that to be free refers to the overall trans-experience 
that explains one‘s place in the world. Being free is the highest order power. Here, we properly speak of not 
just autonomy, but autonomia. It moves beyond given actions, and strikes to who truly controls a given 
situation. It is the choosing to confront the challenges of the world vigor, not to submit to them. Control or 
self-mastery does not mean to act without cost or repercussion. Control, mastery and power mean the 
confrontation of these forces, and then generally, the ability to change those costs and repercussions at will.  
 The amount of freedom one possesses is directly related to the amount of power one commands. 
The more power, the more vigor one confronts the world and the more costs one can bear before submitting 
to some other power.  
 The same dynamic is at play in the different levels of ‗coercion‘ one can practice upon you. Different 
levels of power can withstand different levels of pressure, so any one person can be subjected to the same 
stimulus but end in a different state of freedom. Those with great amounts of power can retain freedom even 
under the highest degrees of pressure; those with very little power crumble under the lightest touch.  
For example, under persuasion, even the mildest person usually maintains all three levels of 
freedom. He acts free, is free to act, and is free.40 He maintains the highest level of control over himself, 
and the costs and benefits that face him. The persuading force is weak, distant and nuanced. Higher levels 
of persuasion, something akin to strong-arming, may weaken his autonomy, by creating a power to fiddle 
with the costs and benefits of a particular decision. This stronger persuasion is distinguished by a greater 
                                                            




proximity to the decision-maker; it is more imminent. It is also more likely to result in the submission of 
quite a few weaker wills.  
The jump from strong-arming to coercing is a matter of degrees. It is a gradual process, as the 
outside force intrudes deeper and deeper into the autonomy of the agent. A power remains with the man 
who decides, but the coercing force makes bolder and bolder plays at confrontation. The two wills can 
become locked in a contest, a struggle for control. The infringement on autonomy, is the limited intrusion 
on the ability to act freely. The agent retains his own power, is not truly under the power of another, but 
nevertheless is less free to act. His autonomy and sovereignty are eroding. As David Hoekema describes, 
―the victim of coercion is free to act but not free to choose; he has the normal sort of control over his bodily 
actions but lacks the normal kinds of control over his choices and their consequences.‖41 Manipulation is a 
particularly insidious form of coercion because it is hidden. The anonymity and secrecy are a source of 
greater power. The manipulator exerts impedes on control from afar; the goal is to remain undetected and, 
therefore, all the more powerful. 
Compulsion includes the greater attempt against the individual. In this state, the outside force is 
not only trying to destroy the actor‘s liberty, by constructing a power above him, but by weakening the 
actor‘s own power, directly and physically. Compulsion is usually required only against those with the 
greatest will power, because the victim would have resisted all other encroachments. In some sense, 
compulsion becomes a tactic in these cases because it offers the ability to change the site of the contest. 
Instead of a contest of wills, compulsion is more often a contest of physical strength.  
FREEDOM EMANATES FROM WITHIN 
Freedom is about internal, conscious power. Even under the strictest, most limited definitions of 
freedom, the source of freedom must be internal. Self-consciousness is the only source of freedom. Whether 
talking about the state or the individual, being free is marked by internal deliberation and determination, even 
against external hindrances. The emphasis of freedom is always on the internal and authentic.   
For the individual, freedom must come from within his own consciousness. It must be authentic to 
the true self and usually to the rational self. Aristotle, for example, spoke of proairesis, a deliberate choice, 
                                                            




fully informed and derived from an internal rationality regime.42 For an action to be fully voluntary and free 
it must accord with reason and deliberation.43 That predisposition introduces a range of discussions one 
what it means for a choice to be rational, deliberate and informed, that is to be free.  
The internal origin of freedom ultimately is also incident on psychological, cognitive determinism. 
If decisions are determined, freedom is false, a cruel deception of human self-consciousness. Because 
freedom, if nothing else, implies one could have done differently, that the self exercised some level of 
control. Determinism denies the possibility ―that men are free to choose between at least two possible 
courses of action – free not merely in the sense of being able to do what they choose to do (and because 
they choose to do it), but in the sense of not being determined to choose what they choose by causes outside 
their control.‖44 Determinism in other words denies the great human spontaneity which many people claim 
as the fundamental element of freedom.45  
This, of course, begs the question of whether some people are truly capable of freedom. Is there 
some limit to freedom? More conservative thinkers are inclined to believe one‘s innate limitations do 
ultimately cap one‘s potential for freedom. Hobbes seems to think not but not because he believes in man‘s 
ultimate potential. He describes a free man as ―he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is 
able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to do.‖46 So one‘s ability does not so much limit 
freedom as much as it specifies the domain on which you measure your freedom. As Hoekema describes, 
―inabilities which are part of the person‘s own physical or psychological nature or condition do not restrict 
freedom. But if similar restrictions were imposed from without, they would be infringements of freedom.‖47 
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Those external restrictions would be unfreedoms because they cordon off your choices based on autarkic 
abilities. In this sense, the origin of the inability is vitally important.48  
Assuming everyone enjoys roughly the same mental capacity, which is not a terribly difficult 
assumption, we must also ask how much knowledge and understanding is necessary for free actions results. 
One must know to control. Manipulation is the unfreedom most incident on discussions of knowledge 
because manipulation endeavors, to unbeknownst to the agent, reduce power and control, even as the 
decision-making power remains within the agent.49 The manipulator tries to reduce your freedom without 
obvious attacks on your liberty.  
 Mill, for example, permits the interference with liberty, i.e. the imposition of power over another, 
when the subject is unaware of the full consequences of action, either do to mental deficiencies or 
unawareness of facts. Mill‘s example of the man attempting to cross a bridge that is about to fail, according to 
Alan Fuchs, ―suggests that we can, and possible should, intervene when a potentially dangerous action 
probably does not accord with that will.‖50 Since some interests of universal among men, such as the 
preservation of life, we can usually make practical, reasonable assumptions in guiding these abridgments of 
liberty. Surely, ceteris paribus, few men wish to try to pass a collapsing bridge, risking death. We serve their 
interests by stopping them to ensure they are in full control of the situation, principally that they are aware the 
bridge is damaged and liable to collapse. In other words, in ensuring their decision has been deliberate.51 We 
are also correct to make sure the conduct is voluntary.52 In the final analysis, however, if the man is both 
aware and has his wits about him, Mill does command we let him go, subject only to our entreaties not to.53  
This type of restriction, however, is not properly thought of as a restriction of freedom, because 
the individual exercised no control over his decision when beginning to cross the dilapidated bridge. 
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Everything about the man could indicate he is an autonomous agent, but merely the lack of knowledge 
about the potential risks, benefits and costs (i.e. his lack of full control over the situation) to make an 
abridgment of freedom permissible. This formulation strongly suggests that control is an essentially part of 
freedom. In other words, it is not the restriction that makes the man unfree. The limitation merely made 
manifest his lack of control over the situation, over the decision to cross the bridge. In the restriction, in 
forcing the individual to reassess the costs and benefits in light of new information, we have, in one sense, 
forced him to be free, to take control of his deliberate choice. 
We now have criteria for determining what is and what is not free action. The impediments 
outside ourselves and directly mutable, particularly the actions of others, are the most odious to free living. 
These factors all profane our own control and power in the world. Not every obstacle is an unfreedom, and 
no single unfreedom automatically renders us absolutely unfree. Instead, it is when we face a conspiracies 
of limitation that our freedom is particularly curtailed. Those social and political conspiracies endemic to 





PART THREE: CHAOS 
Chapter V 
The Liberal Theory of Chaos 
Liberalism is a theory of society without command. It is the theory of society always at risk of 
undoing itself, of dissolving. As Michael Walzer describes, ―association is always at risk in liberal 
society. The boundaries of the group are not policed; people come and go, or they just fade into the 
distance without every quite acknowledging that they have left.‖1 But, for all the howling regarding the 
atomization of man, of collapsing civil society, of bowling alone, people wake up every day, go to work 
every day; the shouting heads shout; people campaign and vote, get married and divorce. They even 
campaign and vote for the right to marry and divorce.  
In life‘s great hustle and bustle, it is easy to lose sight of the liberal miracle. Liberalism as a 
body of thought is often associated with various institutions such as the rule of law, constitutionalism 
and individual rights. These institutions are not themselves liberalism, and excessive reliance on them 
exaggerates the philosophic genealogy.2 They are certainly very important; no liberal society could hold 
together very long without them. The liberal apparatus, however, is just the social mechanism and legal 
machinery. To use Steven Hickerson‘s apt phrase, they are  the ―freedom insurance of liberalism.‖ 3 The 
profound epiphany of liberalism is so much deeper and so much simpler. Liberalism is the theory of the 
harmony of chaos. 
The great liberal insight was the discovery that within society the instruments for its own 
perpetuation can exist. Liberal society is autonomous and self-regulating. Civilization requires no 
leviathan, no single man or group of men, none of Walzer‘s policemen, to hold it together by force, nor a 
commanded regulation of individual activity. The chaos of individual action begets social order.   
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CONTROL AND COMMAND 
 For the vast majority of human history, political elites have employed political control as the 
centripetal force binding society together.4 Both raw violence and unquestionable authority served this 
purpose. True, more civilized thinkers have found authority‘s lighter touch more palatable (and less 
palpable), and thus preferable over sheer violent power; but in both cases, their function is to maintain 
society. Dissolve power and authority, and society diffuses into confusion, bedlam and mayhem. Much of 
Arendt‘s work on authority describes how ―in premodern societies, authority had served to stabilize the 
world by preserving the foundations of the body politic and by tying a people back to its beginning.‖5 
Without these foundations, without Burke‘s regulating institutions, civilization is but vapor.6 To keep order, 
the governments of men had to rule with a fist.  
Many of the oldest, and certainly most interesting, examples of the controlled order philosophy 
relied on fear, power and force to keep society. Thucydides, remarking on the freedom of the people 
Athens, points to fear as the instrument that maintains morality and order. ―In public life,‖ he writes, ―fear 
makes us carefully avoid doing anything illicit.‖7 It is the check of fear that regulates Athenian freedom. 
Athene, Athens‘ guardian goddess,  repeats the sentiment, when she ―warns her citizens not only against 
the slave mentality which bows low before the despot but also against the indiscipline that acknowledges 
no master: ‗Who, being no longer afraid, will still observe the law.‘‖8 Well past the Middle Ages, these 
ideas literally dominated.  
Hobbes is also associated with similar inclinations toward absolute rule. Hobbes‘ despotic 
leviathan is predicated on the belief ―that without the restrains of government men would be in a constant 
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state of war and insecurity…The choice is between despotism and anarchy, and this should be apparent to 
every thinking being.‖9 The men of government were always afraid. Society was always at risk of falling 
apart. Only the force of their command from above kept it together.  
But, Joseph de Maistre presents this disposition in its most grotesque form. For him, constancy 
and divine origin are vitally important for sustaining society. Only ―superior will enforce[es] obedience;‖ 
and  ―force on the one side and powerlessness on the other…[are] the only bond of human society,‖ he 
says.10 In one of his most famous passages, de Maistre expounds on the executioner‘s supreme role in 
buttressing society. For de Maistre, not so much fear of the law, but the raw fear of the force, the 
violence, of the law, personified in the executioner regulates, perpetuates and etern izes society. ―He is 
the terror of human society and the tie that holds it together,‖ de Maistre tells us. ―Take away this 
incomprehensible force from the world and at the very moment order is superseded by chaos, thrones 
fall, society disappears.‖11 de Maistre‘s perspective is extreme, but not unique in anything more than its 
honesty. He does not sugar coat the reality; social order demands fear, power and total domination. 
Without it, nothing remains. 
Even in the relative sanity of Rousseau and Kant, man must have a master to deserve society. Man 
―‗requires a master to break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which 
everyone can be free.‘‖12 Not just freedom, but society, depends on it. For Rousseau, the role of law is 
twofold. It is both ―the external bond that holds in individual wills and prevents their scattering…[and] it is 
the constituent principle of these wills, the element that confirms and justifies them spiritually.‖13 So formal 
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law and social force both keep people together and socialize them for society, making them capable of 
living in a properly free society. 
Especially in Hobbes and de Maistre, the theories of social control are predicated on man‘s natural 
evil. Hobbes, for example, men ―are by nature so quarrelsome and competitive that only the strongest rule 
will restrain them.‖14 Bradley Owen explains de Maistre ―possessed an exquisitely refined sense of the 
nearness of human atrocity, a perennial capacity for barbarism barely held within bounds by institutions, 
ritualized behavior, and myth…His alertness to the interplay of transgression and limits, order and disorder, 
law and violence led him to a conservative defense of limits, order, and law as the lesser of necessary 
evils.‖15 Kant likewise talked about man‘s ―unsocial sociability.‖16 Left to their own devices, Kant 
describes individuals as unrestrained and animalistic, ―generally inclined ‗to play the master over 
others.‘‖17 These different thinkers vary in how society is jumpstarted. For some, government and society 
are simply the triumph of the strongest. Rousseau sends us a law-giver. For the moderately humane, like 
Hobbes, it is by consent. So vicious and wicked are men, they quickly grow weary of violence, the give in 
to social order.18 But beyond the particulars, the central tendency is the same. 
Society‘s delicate condition also necessitated a more static social order. A second portion of the 
command society, one many are more familiar with, was the constancy of an individual‘s position within 
the social structure. Even the slightest perturbation could reverberate through the system, causing it to 
unravel. To keep the system working, every part had a function, and every function a place. To allow 
movement or mobility was the threat of illegitimate risk to stability. Artisans and monarchs alike fretted 
over the destabilizing forces of innovation, and there is no shortage of stories of progress as we understand 
it today being stymied, outlawed, and outright destroyed.19 Society and civilization were always at risk. To 
keep them required a static order, and order demanded control.  
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THE LIBERAL INNOVATION 
That perspective began to die toward the end of the Dark Ages, and really declined into the 
Enlightenment. This change paralleled a new understanding of human nature. Where before the 
philosophies of violence had presented man as ―naturally vicious or wicked,‖ liable to rob you or cut your 
throat given the opportunity.20 The new philosophy happened by a new human nature, one that was given to 
peace and compromise and coexistence.21 Where Hobbes was worried society might rend itself to pieces, 
that the human heart was too dark, too selfish and violent, to be naturally conducive to society, Locke was 
not nearly as concerned about such centrifuge. Instead, ―stability, it has been said, was the central 
assumption of his thinking.‖22 Locke‘s understanding of social stability was the beginning of a new faith in 
society as a self-perpetuating organism. No one had to hold it together; it held itself together.  
The kicker is if society holds itself together, justifications for concentrations of command and 
control ring hollow. Because ―if one can assume that there is a deep social stability underlying and more 
fundamental than government, one will be unwilling to surrender almost all rights for the benefit of 
political order as Hobbes was willing to do.‖23 There remains little justification for concentrations of power 
and force pervasive in pre-liberal societies. If these structures of control are unnecessary, so are the 
injustices they perpetrate. They must be dispensed with. 
Under the new liberal understanding, individuals need not occupy a specific, predetermined place in 
the social structure. Power, authority and tradition, all element of command, are unnecessary.  In tradition‘s 
place, a new fundamental equality ran through the liberal system.24 No one now had ―a moral obligation to 
obey another…that is, the right to command and the duty to obey were no longer written into hereditary social 
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roles as in a caste society.‖25 People were dislodged from their traditional places in society and enabled to 
seek their own life. Through various cycles of struggle and reform, they were, in a word, liberated.26  
Liberalism targeted the great concentrations of power that had marked the previous system of 
social command. Once they began destroying the great edifices of power society, these liberals placed 
nothing in their stead. ―Over a period of generations the market system and accumulation process destroyed 
various old systems of social control (feudalism, mercantilism),‖ Benjamin Ward describes, ―substituting 
new ones for some of them, but in other cases leaving a void.‖27  The new tradition of anti-control lead to a 
reified dichotomy of social life into the economic sphere and the political sphere. The first came to be ruled 
by decentralized economic theories most strongly associated with markets and the laizze-faire philosophy; 
the second, by decentralized power theories, usually discussed in terms of democracy.  
Where there was once order by command, liberalism left the chaos, the eternal conflict of various 
opposed, largely impotent, uncenters of power.  As Siedentop describes, ―The dislodging of individuals 
from fixed positions in a ‗democratic‘ society… release[d] individual ambition and raise[d] expectations; it 
create[d] anxiety, competition and social mobility.‖28 These feelings, the sense of anxiety especially, flow 
directly from systemic chaos liberalism embraces, specifically the competition and social mobility.29   
COSMOS AND TAXIS 
So command and chaos are two fundamental methods for organization society. For us, born and 
raised in the system of chaos, it is hard to understand anything else; but society most certainly does not have 
to be organized this way. For most of human history it has not. Society ―can use the whip of authoritarian rule 
to see that its tasks get done. The pyramids of ancient Egypt did not get built because some enterprising 
contractor took it into his head to build them, nor did the Five Year Plans of the Soviet Union get carried out 
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because they happened to accord with hand-me-down custom or individual self-interest.‖30 The goal of 
feeding, clothing, and sheltering the mass citizenry can just as easily be done by fiat, as by market.31 
Command society is not necessarily totalitarian or utterly oppressive. It is, in fact, pre-totalitarian in a way that 
Arendt would probably understand.32 Command society uses none of the market mechanisms to create wealth 
or organize social action in the way a modern authoritarian state would. A command society is feudal or 
mercantilist. It is more ordered and controlled.   
No one is clearer on this dichotomy between chaos and command than F.A. Hayek. One of his 
greatest contributions to both political and economic  theory is his enunciation of the liberal epiphany, the 
understanding of ―how a predictable and stable, but under designed, order can emerge from the free actions 
of individuals.‖33 Hayek shows how chaos, the absence of command, nonetheless begets a social order 
worthy of the name society. 
Hayek identified two kinds of order. Taxis, or the deliberately constructed order, is ―the made 
order…or any arrangement [that] may again be described as a construction, an artificial order, as an 
organization.‖34 The state, the government apparatus is taxis, the grocery store down the street, the 
communist command economy: They are all taxis. They are by necessity constructed, rigid and hierarchical 
and built by human hands. The old command structure of Hobbes and de Maistre saw society itself as taxis. 
It was something to be made and constructed, and held together.   
Cosmos, on the other hand, is ―the grown order…a self-generating or endogenous order, [and] is 
in English most conveniently described as a spontaneous order.‖35 It is the truth that in comsos ―there exist 
orderly structures which are the product of the action of many men but are not the result of human 
                                                            
30. Robert Heilbroner, The World Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great Economic 
Thinkers, Revised Seventh Edition (New York: Touchstone, 1999), 20. 
 
31. Jonathan Schell, Introduction to On Revolution by Hannah Arendt (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 
xiii.  
 
32. Pre-totalitarian ―tyrants contented themselves chiefly with domination of the political sphere,‖ she says, 
―leaving private life, and sometimes large swaths of economic and cultural life, alone.‖ Schell, xiii.  
 
33. Norm Barry, ―Hayek on Liberty,‖ in Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy, ed. Zbigniew 
Pelcynski and John Gray (New York: The Athlone Press, 1984), 264. 
 
34. F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and 






design.‖36 Oddly enough, Hayek cites morals as his chief example of a human institution which was grown, 
not made, before striking to the best-known, but not well-known, example of the Adam Smith‘s market 
economics. The liberal orthodoxy comprehends society as cosmos. It is something that springs up on its 
own; it need not be held together, or created.   
The traditional world of God is taxis. It was not just constructed; it was constructed in a hasty six 
days. God, in the Christian Bible‘s taxis universe, is the central, all-knowing figure which makes the whole 
thing go round. He created the universe, and is the definitive, final authority on what is, what is to be, and 
what is right. He is the catholic command. The world of scientific liberalism is cosmos. It was organically, 
naturally constructed bit by bit by no one in particular. It is not created, directed or controlled by anyone, 
and at least to some extent is subjective, non-teleological and capricious. Evolution is the order or chaotic, 
random, unpredictable change.37  
The philosophical jump at the heart of liberalism is a belief in society as cosmos. Both political 
and economic liberalism are joined in the realization that society need not be held together, that it in fact is 
cosmos, self-generating and self-sustaining.  
 In realizing society need not be held together, the new liberal orthodoxy changed the fundamental 
purpose of government. Government was no long the necessary evil to keep society from undoing itself. 
Government was a force for the creation of public will. By the time of the Declaration of Independence, the 
purposes of government were very explicitly about effecting the preservation of rights and pursuit of 
happiness, not keeping society from collapsing into anarchy. In this realization, liberalism also deployed 
new orders of government. Instead of production by fiat, we produced and consumed by market.  
It should never be forgotten just about much society as cosmos, society by market, involves a 
willing engagement with risk. Liberal chaos rests on a faith in human capacity and potential. Liberalism 
is the willingness to risk disaster, because it believes the disaster will never come. Economic liberalism 
means you are willing to risk destitution in exchange for the autonomy to make your own life. Political 
liberalism is to risk that people will make bad choices. There is a faith that the risks will be avoided and 
the good will triumph. 
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LIBERALISM’S INVISIBLE POTESTAS 
Hayek‘s goal in delineating cosmos and taxis was to emphasize the self-generating order economic 
thought rested upon. In that successful goal, however, he perhaps neglected the degree to which cosmos 
does not appear to be order at all. It appears to be unadulterated, uncontainable, unconscionable chaos.  
Systems of chaos are created when ―the components of a system do not coordinate but fight one 
another. In its maximal version, remnants of order are barely or not at all discernable.‖38 Form the 
individual point of view, the economic and democratic market system is sheer chaos. Billions of people 
move in trillions of directions, each with different value systems and sympathies. The infinite expanse of 
human society is simply overwhelming.  
Hayek himself, as a conservative, was skeptical of rationalist freedom, the freedom of ―prediction, 
control, and the deliberate manipulation of society.‖39 Hayek was wedded to an understanding of freedom 
as ―spontaneous action, i.e. action which is inherently unpredictable, within traditional rules.‖40 His 
disposition most likely would have been against a determinist understanding of human action, and likewise, 
his understanding of human chaos would have been even deeper. This predisposition makes his belief in the 
order of cosmos even more amazing.  Individual action is random, but social outcomes are determinant. In 
something of a contradiction, free human action is itself unpredictable and spontaneous, but gives rise to a 
rational, predictable order.41 The order is predictable, but on the ground, human spontaneity, human 
movement, appears only as chaos. 
Liberal systems are many things; but they are not control. As Hayek described, cosmos ―induce[s] 
the formation of an order of such complexity (namely comprising elements of such numbers, diversity and 
variety of conditions) as we could never master intellectually, or deliberately arrange.‖42 In destroying 
concentrations of control native to the command societies, by giving into chaos, we create a system both 
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greater and more powerful than each individual separately. Adam Smith‘s invisible hand tricks individuals, 
as Smith said, into ―promot[ing] an end which was no part of his intentions.‖43 In both economic and social 
markets, the cosmos system operates to guide our actions. Walzer describes these new liberal systems as 
―‗social constructions‘ that we, as individuals, have had a hand in making…[but that, we sense, are not] 
wholly made by ourselves.‖44 This is the crux of Adam Smith‘s invisible hand. Our actions are our own, 
but the outcomes are somehow unsynched.  
These structures are not just more powerful than us each individually, they are more powerful than 
each collectively. As so many failed attempts at collective regulation indicate, from Prohibition, to 
immigration to speed limits, once we have acknowledge chaos as a system of government, it is very hard to 
regulate individual actions even when the constitute parts agree regulation is desirable! As Hayek 
continues, over systems of cosmos ―we will have less power over the details of such an order than we 
would of one which we produce by arrangement.‖45 The system is both bigger than any one or any 
combination of ones; it is quite literally beyond the control of individuals, individually or collectively. 
 Indeed, the lack of control is one of its goals and benefits. The struggle of liberalism, after all, 
began in a quest for liberty, for the destruction of potestas, the chief characteristic of command societies. It 
should be clear that command society, society that is maintained, perpetuated and controlled by a 
concentrated force resting above it, is absolutely incompatible with liberty and freedom. There is no liberty, 
because the potestas exists above; it is not freedom because you are by necessity dependent on the potestas 
for your mode of survival. Your place in society, your actions, and your future are all at least theoretically 
determined by the command.  
The process of generating cosmos and the process of achieving liberty are the same, the 
destruction of potestas by taxis. Liberalism liberates us from this power, and sets about the process of 
governance by cosmos.  
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The dirty, if worst-kept, secret of liberalism is that it does not liberate us by destroying power. In 
both command and chaotic societies, power controls. The goal and the regulating power are the same, but 
they come from different sources and attack us in different ways. Robert Heilbroner in The Making of 
Economic Society, along with others, has made a similar argument, suggesting that ―market-capitalism 
represents a system of power incorporating the same processes that were at work in earlier societies 
employing tradition and command.‖46 It is the same process, by a different name.  
Liberalism, instead of destroying power, de-centers it and makes it invisible. Just think of Smith‘s 
invisible hand. The hand itself is real enough, just like it might be in a command society. When the 
invisible hand slaps you, it hurts. The clever bit is the hand‘s invisibility and disembodiment. Its power 
does not come from above, it is not a potestas; instead, the power and regulating force of markets come 
from around. The market power pervades the ether. It is at the same time no one and everyone, nowhere 
and everywhere. As Heilbroner explains,  
The beautiful consequence of the market is that it is its own guardian. If 
output or prices or certain kind of remuneration stray away from their 
social ordained levels, forces are set into motion to bring them back to 
the fold. It is a curious paradox that thus ensures the market, which is 
the acme of individual economic freedom, is the strictest taskmaster of 
all. One may appeal the ruling of a planning board or win the 
dispensation of a minister; but there is no appeal, no dispensation, from 
the anonymous pressures of the market mechanism. Economic freedom 
is thus more illusory than at first appears. On can do as one pleases in 
the market. But if one pleases to do what the market disapproves, the 
price of individual freedom is economic ruination.47 
 
The language is clearly reminiscent of the difference between acting freely and being free to act. 
Within the market prison, I can act freely to do what I am allowed to do by the constraints. But as soon as I 
push those constraints, as I dare to act differently, I tempt the forces of power to close in on me. One is not 
truly free to act in a market society.  
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The market is nothing more than a decentralized system for ―enforcing discipline and order in our 
social system.‖48 The market systems are morally and functionally superior because they provide the 
function of tradition and command without arbitrary tyranny.49 Hayek‘s emphasis tends to be on the 
efficiency of cosmos. It is a system that ―emerged to cope with man‘s necessary ignorance, to co-ordinate 
actions in a more effective way than deliberately designed ones could.‖50 Although this is certainly true, 
and extremely important, it belies the deeper understanding of liberalism important here. These systems 
allow us to ―extend the scope or range of the order which we may induce to form‖ without increasing the 
control of any individual because the system ―will utilize the separate knowledge of all its several 
members, without this knowledge ever being concentrated in a single mind, or being subject to those 
processes of deliberate coordination and adaptation which a mind performs.‖51 The nonliberal command 
societies are characterized by the concentration of power in a person or elite cabal. The liberal are 
characterized by the decentralization; they provide us with liberty. 
DEMOCRACY AND CONSTRAINT 
Another way of putting this is true liberalism operates to replace restraints with constraints. 
Restraint connotes a singular force which holds and binds another. One person restrains another. This is the 
most typical form of tyranny, where an individual is kept from doing or acting because some force, the 
state or a man prevents it.  
Constraint, however, uses a different prefix, one that emphasizes multiple sites and origins of 
restraint. In liberal theories, the collective, the market, works to constrain the behavior of any one 
individual. There is no singular source of power or authority. It comes from all directions. In liberalism, no 
one creates the forces that bind society; indeed, one could even say the forces never exist in any specific 
time and place. They are both present and absent. Both real and imaginary. This new hand of the market, is 
invisible, disembodied and far stronger. Chaos is not anarchy.52 
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The liberal campaign was not so much a quest to destroy or obviate power, as it was to disperse it 
fully and completely. So, ―they began by challenging kings but aimed to set limits everywhere, even 
(sometimes especially) on the collective decisions of the ‗people.‘ They agreed early on that the best way to 
set limits was to divide and disperse the capacity to exercise power.‖53 Where command is concentrated and 
hierarchical, whether in the form of power, control or authority, liberalism has been shockingly effective.  
Liberalism makes very few attempts, and is very bad at, dispersing lateral power, the power we 
exert on each other. On one level this is because these are the very forces which liberalism uses to regulate 
human behavior. Markets, by setting prices, regulate behavior, not hierarchically, but laterally. They push 
us into certain types of behavior, not by thumbing us into submission.  
DEMOCRATIC COSMOSIS 
Thus far, I have used the language of economics and markets to describe cosmos. Most people do. 
There tends to be an uneasy truce between the economic and political arms of liberalism. Economists see the 
political world as illogical, passion-driven and inefficient. Politics more often creates trouble than solutions.  
Likewise, the language of economists is often anathema in political science.  ‗Market‘ is 
somewhat a dirty word for many political theorists. It is something apolitical, an atomized sphere of 
particular interests, a place not just of self-interest, but selfishness, consumerism and profligacy. The 
unfortunate attitude obscures the dynamic virtue of markets, as decision-making structures. But for that 
reason, it is difficult to use the word market, and the word democracy or democratic, especially in the way 
Tocqueville was given to using the term, better captures the idea. When one understands democratic society 
properly, the sharp distinction between economic and political markets melts away.   
Democracy, in theory if not in practice, is little more than the perfect idealized market for policy. 
Both democracy and market-capitalism have ―made change and dynamism – rather than order and tradition 
– the governing philosophy of the modern age.‖54 They both de-center and democratize decision-making. 
Consumers (citizens), trade, buy and sell, (debate) goods (ideas about the perfect society), until they finally 
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purchase (vote) on a conclusion, before start the process again. Most contemporary democratic forms, even 
deliberative democracy, are reconcilable with some form of liberal economic metaphor, because in the end 
democracy is government by cosmos. There might be man-made praxis in the Arendtian constructed spaces 
where deliberation takes place and in the government apparatus, but these are lagniappe. They themselves 
are not democracy any more than the physical act of voting is democracy.  
Strip them away, and what remains is dynamic democratic cosmosis. It is the organic, deliberative 
process, the sharing of experience and knowledge. Democracy may end in the construction of praxis, erected 
orders for the dissemination of policy outcomes. But the process itself is cosmos. There are attempts at 
―deliberate coordination‖ characteristic of praxis, but anyone who has worked in government knows these 
attempts are rarely successful. Democratic knowledge is always imperfectly shared when democracy is 
practiced en masse. Democratic operation is the process of many people seeking many different goals, 
coalescing into coalitions when expedient, often without ever even realizing they are. No one individual ever 
dictates or decides; there is sharing, but no concentration of knowledge. The government by the people is a 
cosmos. To think otherwise is to confuse democracy with the government apparatus, process with procedure. 
An authoritarian government is pure taxis, it is top-down, all decisions, or at least every decision of any 
importance, is made at the top, and is necessarily constrained by an individual ability and will to know, 
understand and control. Democracy is no such thing; it is purely decentralized and un-hierarchical.  
 Both democratic and economic markets, despite what is said about them, liberate but do not free. 
The process of liberalism is the process of liberation; it is the destruction of the centers of power that 
practice potestas upon society. Liberal chaotic orders, however, do nothing to free, nothing to create power 
within its subjects, nor render them sovereign. They replace restraint with constraint. Worse still, liberal 
society outsources control. When we are faced with undesirable outcomes, we are impotent. Even when we 
agree on change, change is elusive. The very cosmos structure conducive to our social liberty is destructive 






Political philosophers have always understood that society limits liberty and freedom, an 
understanding that has led a number of theorists to stoop to an ahistorical theorizing of the perfect pre-
society. John Locke begins with a ―natural liberty of man [that] is to be free from any superior power on 
earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man.‖1 He is to be his own master. John 
Milton, speaking in the mid-17th century, boldly declares no one ―can be so stupid to deny that all men 
naturally were born free, being the image and resemblance of God himself.‖2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
likewise, understood the unique qualities of natural freedom, ―which is limited only by the force of the 
individual.‖3 The pre-social savage, he says, ―breathes only repose and freedom‖ and could never 
understand slavery or dominus, potestas or control.4  
Early liberal thought is particularly prone to the pre-social fiction, the vision ―of a presocial self, a 
solitary and sometimes heroic individual confronting society, who is fully formed before the confrontation 
begins.‖5 Perfect freedom, the thinking seems to imply, is something discovered only before society, before 
the construction of social power and force.6  
Locke, Milton and Rousseau, just to name three, all reminisce at the wonders that were lost and 
from which they were seized. They all introduce society by way of eulogy because they sense something 
sinister in social arrangements necessitating, or causing, abridgments on freedom. Some, like Thoreau, 
yearn to put back to nature and restore the promise of pure asocial freedom. The mainstream merely 
                                                            
1. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. Thomas Peardon (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1997), 15. 
 
2. John Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates. Quoted in Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 19.  
 
3. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, One the Social Contract, with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy, ed. 
Roger D. Master, Translate Judith Masters (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin‘s, 1978), 56.  
 
4. Quoted in Stephen Ellenburg, ―Rousseau and Kant: principle of political right,‖ in Rousseau after 200 
Years: Proceedings of the Cambridge Bicentennial Colloquium, ed. R. A. Leigh (Cambridge, London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), 6.  
 
5. Michael Walzer, ―The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,‖ Political Theory 18, no. 1 (Feb. 1990), 20. 
 
6. This is not the only understanding. As mentioned before Arendt argues the Greeks understood freedom as 




dismayed at the freedom that was, while rationalizing and justifying the social limits.  For most of them, the 
threat of violence is what pushes man away from the state of perfect independence. Afraid of impairments 
on their liberty, people limit their freedom.  
Cast down from Eden, ―the liberty of man in society is to be under no other legislative power but 
that established by consent in the commonwealth, no under the dominion of any will or restrain of any law 
but what that legislative shall enact.‖7 For Rousseau, individual freedom in society ―is limited by the 
general will.‖8 It is not there is some different liberty in society, but that this new liberty of society is the 
best man can hope for. Man must be in society, and so he must have a new understanding of freedom and 
liberty to go along with that new social order.  
Liberal society appear as society born in sin. It is a crime foisted upon the people, an invention of 
cruel necessity. As Max Pohlenz describes, the state for these liberals is ―a human organization shaped by 
history, which [is] only a means to an end if not indeed a necessary evil.‖9 The cruel accident of nature has 
made cooperation and society necessary for life, without endowing men with the capacity to make 
cooperation easy.10 With its indigenous burdens and constraints, society renders free life a pale imitation of 
itself. The liberal task becomes to make the best of the imperfect situation, to limit the power constructed in 
necessity. It is odd, indeed, that a line of philosophy so reluctant and suspicious of social freedom, freedom 
beyond nature, should effectively become freedom‘s signet.  
This tragic contradiction is especially apparent in the earliest writers, who were primarily 
interested in the justification and origin of political power and much less about democratic practice. 
Arguing for the consent of the governed like Locke, as noted before, required very little of him by way 
ensuring the freedom, the self-power, of citizens. Lockean and Hobbesian societies were largely the slave 
societies of free men. The free men of presociety freely entered into the commonwealth to preserve some 
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quality more important than their independence, whether liberty, property or their very lives. Once this 
transfer was completed, the sovereign exercised an impressive power over the population. 
 This system ultimately proved unsatisfactory, because it left people dependent on the sovereign 
will. The problem of politics then became something altogether different. The problem was not where the 
sovereign power originated and on whose behalf it was exercised. Instead, it was how the people might 
most effectively and freely rule themselves. In other words, how might citizens maintain the benefits of 
society without losing the control, the freedom, the self-government, they practiced in the state of nature.11  
SOCIAL CONSTRAINT 
The great challenge of government, what Rousseau called the fundamental problem of politics, is 
how to avoid ―dependence on the goodwill of others.‖12 As discussed previously, the threat of dependence 
on another for one‘s existence and freedom is a prima facie indication of one‘s unfreedom.  
The central difficulty, of course, is the simple fact entering society begins the process of depending 
on others. Constructing the state, one must consider the power of society itself and the very real ways society 
constrains the practice of self-government. Entering into society, the proximity of other agents, automatically 
constrains freedom from all directions. It is not simply that in society the presence of one person‘s freedom 
delimits another‘s. This is certainly true to the extent populations diminish scarce resources. It is also true to 
the degree that interests and goals can conflict. One is not free to hit another, because the freedom from being 
hit is superior. Society does more than this simple limitations on pure autonomy.  
As we saw in Chapter 2‘s discussion of Thoreau and the unfreedom of dependence, society breeds 
relations of unfreedom by promoting the interdependence of constituent participants.  As Thoreau 
demonstrates, entanglements with society, by obligating us and making binding requirements on us limit 
the experience of our freedom.  
The discussion takes place in all sorts of political discussions, but the implications are hardly ever 
fully parsed. Debates over energy-dependence and sovereign debt, for example, inevitably fall to 
discussions of freedom. A careful observer will note how integration into the world economy, by 
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thickening the social web of interaction, likewise limits the autonomous decision-making, the freedom, of 
states. External considerations constrain the domain of possible actions. 
The problem is that liberalism, both democratic and market, thicken dependence. Tocqueville, for 
instance, is famous for recognizing how ―social obligations‖ imposed very powerful constraints on 
individual action in American democracy.13 In democracy, you become dependent on the coalition of 
people to get things do. Or, you are dependent on him to adopt your preferences, or at least to give in to 
mutual modification. In the market, you are dependent on an objectivity, uncontrollable price-setting 
mechanism. You are dependent on the market for labor, availability of wages, etc. There is not only no 
control, there is ever increasing levels of dependency. You are dependent on the man next door to make 
your shoes, the milkman to deliver milk, and the butcher to cut the meat. You are locked into a system 
which is both beautiful and frightening delicate.  
French President Charles de Gaulle complained the integration of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization more often than not became a ―euphemism for control.‖14 That control, he said, limited the 
member states, or at the very least the weaker member states, subordinating them to the will of all others. 
They were subordinated to the will of the rest.15 Dependence is the ―state of being determined or 
significantly affected by external forces[, and] Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual 
dependence.‖16 As Keohane and Nye show, relations of interdependence are rife with power, and they very 
successfully demonstrate ―mutual dependence can be used as a power resource‖ in international relations.17 
What is true for the sovereign state is no less true for would-be sovereign individuals. The only real 
difference is anything approaching effective society is a relatively recent international creation. In that 
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transformation, it is possible to see the freedom deflation, society has wrought, chiefly by means by 
degrading state‘s internal power.   
In point of fact, that is not a drawback, it is the point. Free trade is not supposed to prevent war by 
perfecting the people, encouraging their transcendence to higher levels of peaceful humanity. Free trade, by 
encouraging specialization, means to make war incomprehensively costly by slowly eroding the autarkic 
sustainability of economies. Globalization might prevent war; it might improve people‘s lives; it might 
even further the liberation of the masses of mankind. It does so, however, by limiting freedom. 
 Very many are afraid of this interference, afraid of the way it erodes control to make one‘s life 
according to one‘s will, afraid of the precarious position and the potential doom if anything goes awry. For 
these people, the problem of politics not only becomes a way of creating social power, but creating 
controllable social power. Power that enables liberty, the absence of control over oneself, and freedom, the 
control over one‘s world.  
The most important way that society constrains is far more subtle. Social forces bind us, constitute 
us, in ways very similar to the uncomfortable influence genetics, biology and chemistry hold against the 
mind.18 It is impossible to get away from these forces and nearly impossible to control them. Every social 
system is a system of control and coercion. The virtues of physical existence construct natural boundaries 
and constitute behavior in ways that are neither controllable nor ameliorable. They are constant and forever. 
The social construction of wants and preferences is well-established. Choices made by social 
actors are never truly autonomous or internally created because preferences which guide and determine 
intentions are themselves ―shaped by a process that preempts the choice?‖19 Michel Foucault is among the 
best at demonstrating this truth. Power in the modern age is not simply about meeting desires, it plays a 
crucial role in deciding what those desires are. Power is an ―insidiously creative force‖ with the object of 
forming and constructing life in ways directly incident on what it means to be free.20 
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The outside factors constitute an influence at best, and the true origin at worst, of our wants, goals 
and desires in such a way that violates the sovereignty presumption of freedom.  
As liberation has become more complete with the abolition of forms of restraint upon actions, these 
social chains have become more and more chaffing. As a result, ―mistrust of the state has broadened to 
become a more generalized mistrust off society and culture as a whole…As liberals have recognized, society 
and culture themselves impose limits on autonomy in the form of moral norms and mores, which may be as 
powerfully and coercively enforced in informal social settings as any formal law is by the government.‖21 So 
it does not seem enough anymore, if it ever was, that  ―preferences [are] autonomous merely because they are 
consciously and reflexively formed.‖22The usual prescriptions of rationality are not enough to make one free. 
The external influences on both the preferences which are consciously judged, the metapreferences which do 
the judging, and even the process by which we go about consciously forming are all socially constituted. This 
makes the notion of self-fashion or self-creation a farce.23 It has reduced many to assert it is enough to be 
―capable of reflecting critically on the values that have governed… socialization.‖24 Social position influences 
wants and desire, perhaps to a point that it is a cruel fiction to speak of any kind of authentic internal 
government of the self. Socially induced preferences are the fifth column of unfreedom. 
CIVITATIS POTESTAS 
The state presents a particular problem, because it is the necessary concentration of aggregated 
individual power, a taxis, with the potential to become potestas over me. As Qunetin Skinner describes, 
―the state has a duty not merely to liberate its citizens from such [mutual] personal exploitation and 
dependence, but to prevent its own agents, dressed in a little brief authority, from behaving arbitrarily in the 
course of imposing the rules that govern our common life.‖25 The problem becomes how to control without 
being controlled. To control, someone must command, but the only permissible command is one I control. 
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For Rousseau and other republican types, the answer is to make people direct owner, direct 
participator in the government. As Gary Reed describes, ―since politics is a matter of control, of who 
control[s?] whom, and in what ways, the only possible political ‗self-control‘ is control shared with 
others.‖26 The struggle to resolve this tension is a hallmark of much democratic theory and usually rests on 
the ability of people to share in the control of their government.  
The difficulty with the republican approach, best exemplified by Rousseau, is it simply tends to 
replace a patria potestas with a civitatis potestas. The problem is instead by liberating us from the power 
of and dependence on one, these institutions enslave us to the power of and dependence on many. 
Control is what I give up, and if I get any modicum of it back, in a republican democracy, it is usually at 
the expense of my liberty.  
Part of the problem is certainly equality. The push toward equality serves to end domination of the 
usual sort by reducing individual power to zero. Equality is the antithesis to the patria potestas, the power 
of one over another. It creates, what the Greek democrats were conditions of isonomy. When all are equal, 
no one controls and no one dominates. In this sense, equality serves, as Elizabeth Anderson puts it, ―to end 
oppression, which by definition is socially imposed…to create a community in which people stand in 
relations of equality to others.‘‖27 But equality alone is liberty, not freedom, because it only destroys 
others‘ power over me and does nothing to project my own power over my affairs or the affairs of others. 
So even if we could attain equality by some equitable process that did not in and of itself destroy freedom, 
by robbing them of their wealth, control does not ensure because we are left only with the impotence, and 
anti-control, equality necessarily entails.   
The first part of the process is ordinary enough. Repeating it here is not necessary, except to say 
that advocates of equality must contend with the fact that the equalizing process necessitates a central, 
dominating power. The relationship between centralized power and equality was realized by the French 
liberals. Larry Siedentop describes how many of the French liberals before that country‘s revolution had 
identified the process that connected the equalizing and centralizing processes. Making every man equal 
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required constructing a central authority exercising power equally over all. The central authority weakened 
the local elites by robbing them of their effective sovereignty over their lands, and operated to protect the 
formerly subjugated prerogatives of hoi polloi. The solution for the French thinkers was the system of free 
moeurs, the manners and lifestyle of a free people, very similar to American reliance on republican virtue.28 
Free moeurs quite literally constituted ―an active citizenry attached to local freedom and joined together in 
numerous voluntary associations  —  the only real safeguard against excessive centralization, which, in 
turn, destroys free moeurs.‖29 The only method of achieving freedom is by keeping the body politic small 
and manageable, thereby promoting equilibrium between corporate power over individuals and individual 
power over the corporate.30 Even if the process of generating equality is equitable and not by force, it 
necessitates the creation of a strong central government which threatens to render liberty empty.   
The more interesting, and I think damning, element of equality is the way it confounds control. 
This relationship is also well-understood. Rousseau himself described the individual democratic power as a 
perfect, 1/n, share of the sovereignty.31 For a modern mass democracy, this effectively means, as Walzer 
puts it, ―One person, one vote, one quantum of influence and power.‖32 In short, it means nothing. The 
more perfect the democracy, the more powerless the person. The democratizing, equalizing process reduces 
power to naught. As it declines, the share of the uncontrolled power of any one citizenl becomes absolute. 
Because he holds and possesses no discernable quantity of control over society or government, the 
democratic individual, based on a calculation of his own power, has no reason to feel any freer than the 
despotic object. Even though the power of the autocratic sovereign is dissolved does not mean an effective 
power, or control is centered among the individual citizens. 
The democratic man‘s only solace is the fact that the power against him is isolated and 
fragmented. It is not united above, and so does not properly offend his liberty. Although he does not 
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possess power or control, neither does anyone else. The democratic citizen is freer to the extent that he does 
not face a concentration of power over or against him. Again, to stress, however, this is the quality of being 
liberated, of being outside the power of another. In his condition, the democratic man is without 
sovereignty or self-mastery in any senses of the terms. 
In Rousseau‘s understanding, by contrast, ―each man, by giving himself to all, gives himself to 
nobody.‖33 In this Rousseau is surely correct in the sense that no higher figure exists above him. There is no 
pater to exercise potestas. Rousseau‘s difficulty is in the second half of the construction, ―and since there is 
no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right that he has given the other over himself, he 
gains the equivalent of everything he had lost and more power to preserve what he has.‖34 But the 
democratic man has gained no power because he exercises no control, and no means for exercising control. 
The citizen, in fact, gains nothing over his fellows.  Any power he does command is a violation of the 
central equality principle. In establishing this point, Rousseau believes he has solved the problem of politics 
by constructing a system in which man obeys only himself.35  
As even Benjamin Constant reasoned, the size of the body politic does play into this.36 The Greek 
freedom was so more powerful, he suggested, because the states were small and the share of power each 
citizen possessed, though a fraction, was nevertheless of palpable fraction. The Greek citizen could feel the 
effects and exercise of his control and so it satisfied him. In modern society, however, the same power is 
divided many millions of times. The citizen is left without an iota of control over the society if he were to 
vote, and even less if the whole mass were to try to speak or move at once.  
The small, local democracy seems to be the only one that might work as a provider of freedom. ―One 
of the first things we learn about the newly discovered island of Utopia,‖ Quetin Skinner reminds us, ―is that 
its citizens live in fifty-four self-governing cities.‖37 As Skinner continues, he explores the small, geographic 
concentration of Utopia‘s political organization that gives rise to its experience of freedom.  The advocacy of 
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small is not new. It has played a central role in the history of this country, usually in the form of federalism 
debates. Advocates from both the political left and right have used the arguments, often placing special 
emphasis on small, homogenous societies, where citizens may still feel the effect of their power, or more 
precisely where their power still has effect. The small, uniform society helps alleviate the pressures that vote 
dilution exacts on individual democratic control, and so heighten the experience of freedom. 
Small need not refer to only geographic concentration or population numbers. In fact, it is far more 
common in relation to diversity and the emphasis on the singular society of the self. Rousseau and others 
try to obviate the discussion of social control by insisting that in properly governed or constituted societies, 
the only social control is indistinguishable from self-control. Under J. Hope Mason‘s reading, Rousseau in 
the Social Contract believed social freedom is necessarily proscribed, but that ―limit also need not be a 
restriction.‖38 The society of a single consciousness, cloned a million times over, is not unfree whether 
ruled by one or by the whole million and one, because the government would be the same.  
The perfectly free society, for Rousseau, becomes one that is ruled by a collective of individuals 
who are similar in every important respect. It is a society in which politics, political struggle and 
disagreement essentially ceases. They are replaced with the congruent consensus, agreement based not on 
comprise and negotiation but on absolute preference equivalence. Individual wills cease, and a true social 
freedom, freedom of sovereignty and self-government are achieved because the only ruling will is the will 
each citizen would impose on himself in the absence of society. This is how Rousseau can seem to be about 
both freedom and totalitarianism. His freedom is a law, and perfect submission to the law, but it is a social 
law applied perfectly. The law is not a restriction because the society and the individual are one. Or, in 
other words, the separate self has ceased to exist, and only a social self remains. As Cassierer says, freedom 
and law for Rousseau, ―did not mean arbitrariness [as in the independent rule of a self] but the overcoming 
of all arbitrariness.‖39 The limitation of law need not be a restriction because one does not chafe at the 
application of self-law, practiced rules of conduct created by a self and imposed on the self. There may be 
many bodies, many personalities even, but each man, woman and child would want and aspire to the same 
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conduct. In this way, ―the individual in uniting himself with all others nevertheless obeys only himself in 
this act of union.‖40  It is the construction of free society, ruled by a common will, by means of the 
destruction of the separate self.  
Still, to most observers there is something artificial to Rousseau‘s freedom. It involves a surrender of 
the individual sovereignty we enjoy today, a destruction of the self in every way we understand it. It involves 
making us fit for free government, forcing us to be free. Though the ultimate goal would be to give us control, 
it would do so by taking it away. Rousseau‘s plan might be extreme, but others share the sentiment.  
As mentioned previously, deliberative democratic theories try to internalize the tension between 
individual selves and social control. Like Rousseau‘s democracy of the unitary social self, deliberative 
democrats try to reform people during the policy-making process, thereby making social constraints more 
palatable. Deliberative democracy becomes the process of controlling the constituting forces of society for 
political effect.41 Where Rousseau simply expected men to acquiesce to the general will, deliberative 
democrats seek to create it. They do not ―regard preferences and interests as brute facts that uncritically can 
serve as input to legitimate democratic decision making.‖42 In this regard, deliberative democracy in some 
formulations violates the principle of autonomous opinion formation because ―deliberation [specifically] 
asks citizens to adjust their preferences and beliefs in light of the limits of their circumstance and the 
beliefs and preferences of other citizens.‖43 I am not particularly saying deliberation is bad or morally 
abhorrent, but it strains credibility to call it freedom. It abandons the notion of freedom as original and 
internal, and forces us to accept only the weakest formulations of freedom. 
SOCIAL COMMAND 
We understand freedom as the concentration of effective control, but all these remedies operate to 
dilute control. The only legitimate control for these thinkers is shared control, but shared control, more 
often than not, means no individual control with complete individual subordination.  
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These thinkers all chafe at the central undeniable fact that social existence limits freedom, limits 
individual control, in very palpable ways, by constraining our actions, limiting our capacity, even 
shaping our thoughts. The majority of these limits, and especially the constitution of individual 
preferences, are cosmos. No one intends or plans them; they simply spring up and practice their art upon 
us by virtue of our interactions.  
In order to recapture the lost freedom, these democratic minds all seek a range of anti-liberal 
solutions that arrange social political power above these processes, above the process of equalization, 
above the process of socialization, above the process of economic accumulation. Karl Marx is the apogee 
of this line of thought. Marx ―enjoyed power; mastery, domination, Herrschaft,‖ just as much as the next 
man. The concepts were essential to his understanding of freedom, which was the freedom of control.44 The 
great harmony of his vision was the hopeful discovery of communal freedom, where no one was master and 
everyone was endowed with ―an expression and realization of power, self-assertion to an unlimited 
degree.‖45 Much of the Marxist promise was a means of taking those social relations and 
―subjecting…[them] to conscious control.‖46 Feminist and some conservative critiques of liberalism follow 
the same trend. As Walzer intimates, ―socialization is always coercive, but its character and condition are 
open to democratic debate and reform.‖47 The central point is that these reforms may make the world more 
just, but by definition, they cannot make the world freer, without significantly weakening the idea of what 
it means to be a self or what it means to be in control. 
Republican democracy does not just found a body politic, it constitutes a power politic. It fashions 
a concentrated, singular civitatis potestas that regulates and controls men with autocratic force. What 
appears at first glance to be isonomic no-rule is in fact something very different: all-rule.48 It is more taxis 
than cosmos, because its purpose is the creation, the formation, the design of society from a unified 
consciousness above. The ultimate goal is to tame the cosmos, to replace chaos with control.  
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Liberal society is the exaltation of the very same social processes. In its truest forms, liberalism 
calls for these processes to be the only social regulators. And though there is always room to problematize 
them, we do gain degrees of freedom when we know and accept these influences, we cannot in any way 
solve or banish them. They are part of the cosmos, part of the centripetal structures instigating society. The 
lack of control and central manipulation is what makes them legitimate.   
Liberal society and government leave you with no more than modicums of power. In short, a 
liberal citizen is left with his liberty and autonomy. He is free from the burdens of dominus potestas; he has 
his liberty. He is also at will to leave the body politic, if he so desires; he has his autonomy. He, however, is 
not free. He has no power of his own. He is dependent upon and constrained by his fellows in ways both 
magnificent and subtle. His preferences are constituted by social structures; his incentives to action 
determined by the uncontrollable actions of countless, faceless figures all around him. He is powerless, and 
his powerlessness is exactly the object of liberalism. It is what liberalism is all about. He is alone; he is 
powerless; he is a slave without a master.49  
 
                                                            





Freedom is a dead end. In its worst formulations, freedom arouses yearning for an unattainable 
control and autonomy. Intoxicated by its alluring promises of power and control, we chafe at the 
restrictions and boundaries that remain. Even as we bust concentrations of control, we quail at yet new 
frontiers of obstructions to our own power. In hoping to find personal empowerment in liberal society, we 
sow the seeds of our own despair.  
The attractive quixotic self-governance of freedom threatens to, in Isaiah Berlin‘s words, ―acquire an 
unchecked momentum and an irresistible power over multitudes of men that may grow too violent to be 
affected by rational criticism.‖1 Realizing the emptiness of liberal freedom, new regimes pop up, promising 
great freedom based on ―man‘s domination over nature and…rational control over social relations.‖2 In the 
end, though, even these fail. Freedom‘s false promises threaten to undermine the liberal order and the hard-
fought liberty surrounding it, and mankind risks losing its best hope for a better future. The advance of 
illiberal democracy and state capitalism is just that.3 Facism, communism, even fanatic, tyrannical 
libertarianism: they all begin in the guarantee of the freedom liberalism fails to create, and they all end in 
terror.  Faced with the impossibility of the dream, we risk falling into nightmare. Liberal society is far from 
perfect. There are plenty of avenues to pursue better social arrangements, to struggle for better laws, debate a 
better morality, and encourage each other to live better lives. Liberal society need not leave people cold and 
alone. If anything, there is a paradox in the anti-liberal claims that liberalism renders us isolated and apart 
while at the same time molding our behavior under the massive weight of a gargantuan socializing power.  
These social forces complicate the story of self-ownership and self-determination. How can we 
really say ―a person is free…[when she is able] to pursue her life in her own way‖ when what she wants in 
a life, the methods that count as pursuit and even what she considers her way are not truly hers at all.4 That 
social power is the modern progeny of the autocrat, the great taskmaster. The point I wish to stress is that it 
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is not a power that comes from above, but from around. It binds and pushes, forms and molds, around 
participants. It originates in this moment as the product of over thoughts and actions, and is perpetuated in 
the next by our thoughts and actions. It is, in a manner of speaking, a market. It is a spontaneous, self-
perpetuating structure, a cosmos of understanding. We could tame these forces with taxis. Create structures, 
individually or collectively, to define and freeze these constitutive forces, but then we would no longer live 
in a liberal society. We would be opting for order by command.   
A FUTURE FOR FREEDOM? 
Where freedom means the realization or pursuit of life within these structures, there is little to 
complain about. The central problem involves claims to control, exertion against society and the regulating 
structures in a way that is the opposite of freedom. It is an admission that I shall be governed, I shall be 
dependent on forces beyond myself, forces I could control, at least in theory, if given the chance, but will not. 
Freedom is fugitive, and I say let it go. Freedom is control, but our control has receded to chaos. We 
could dispel chaos; we could replace or contain cosmos with taxis. Such an ordered, constructed society 
would, in fact, be the historical norm. But even then freedom would be the privilege of control. Any kind of 
mass freedom is simply impossible in the physical world, a world of frictions and failures. It would be far 
better to abandon freedom, ditch misconceived notions of pure agency and acknowledge that freedom and 
control are deceptions of hubris. Such a mode of living would be in keeping with history. It was a spirit alive 
in the early periods of the republican. ―A cautious member of the Massachusetts constitutional convention of 
1820-21,‖ Harry Watson describes, ―contrasted ‗a spirit of universal or unlimited liberty‘ [that is, freedom] 
with ‗the spirit of limited liberty; or reciprocal control,‘ and other republican advocates would have agreed 
with him, at least in principle.‖5 Our liberty should be enough.   
One last distinction is in order. Freedom is possible. It is possible in society. It is not possible, 
however, for everyone. In a grand sense, we have three tactics. We can follow Thoreau into the woods, 
sacrificing society;6 or we can tie each other closer and closer together in social bonds, sacrificing the 
individual self; or finally, despite the complications explicated by the ancients, Rousseau and others, we can 
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pursue our own individual domination, sacrificing everyone else‘s liberty.7 These different tactics reveal 
liberalism and freedom are not oil and water. The two can coexist, even if they are at odds. The truth 
presented here is liberalism does not create freedom, nor bestow or cultivate it among the people. Instead, 
liberal capitalism, as we practice it today, offers individuals the opportunity to create it in themselves. The 
masses of men marvel and celebrate the willful personalities with the indigenous power, energy and vigor 
necessary to push the horizons of their freedom. These captains of industry are the men who appear the most 
free, because at the end of the day they are. Their freedom, however, is not something born in liberalism, 
though liberty might have made it easier for them to realize their freedom. These men and women owe their 
freedom, their autonomy, sovereignty and power, to their own energy. They created freedom within 
themselves, by attacking the world. Their success, their achievements of wealth and freedom, might have been 
facilitated by freedom; but it is just as likely they would have come to be free in any society, by the sheer 
force of their will and talents. The lions are the Alexanders, the Chengis Khans, the Tamerlanes, of the 
modern age. They are free because they make themselves free, not because the liberal system empowers them. 
If there is a promise in liberalism, it is these men may pursue freedom without violent contests of power. 
By the same token, we must remember how powerless liberty renders most men. It is very easy for the 
liberated individual to fall victim to the forces around him. He can be lost; he can be forgotten in the chaos. We 
must remember liberty can be excruciating. Every day, it forces individuals to bring their dismal power to bear 
against conflagration. It is not empowering, it is exhausting. And, people need the power of escape. Humanity 
and compassion demand people retain the right of escape, the opportunity, to be taken care of.  
Because what matters most is control. When people thirst for freedom, they hunger for control. To 
bar people from that solace, to compel them to face the despotism of caprice and disorder of liberal society 
day after day, without respite, would reduce liberalism to yet another potestas, to a tyranny of chaos. 
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